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INTRODUCTION
The financial ability to rebuild the World Trade Center depended in part
on whether the events in New York City on September 11, 2001 should be
described as one event or two.' If the attack on September ii ought to be
described as one event, the owners of the World Trade Center (WTC) were
entitled to recover approximately $3.5 billion, not nearly enough to rebuild.2 If
the attack should be described as two events, the owners were entitled to
recover over $7 billion, an amount closer to that needed to rebuild.'
The precise description of the events of September 11 matters because the
insurance policies covering the WTC provided recovery on a "per-occurrence"
basis with a cap of $3.5 billion for each occurrence.' The definition of
"occurrence" and whether the attack constituted one or two occurrences so
defined was critical, therefore, to the amount of recovery. Unsurprisingly,
lengthy litigation over the term ensued. The dispute was complicated by the
fact that the parties had not completed a final insurance contract by September
ii and various drafts and relevant documents had, at least according to the
litigants, contradictory implications.6 In the end, a jury found that a majority
of the insurers of the property were bound to a form that treated what
happened on September 11 as one occurrence, while a minority of insurers were
1. See generally Kirk A. Paisch, An Analysis of the World Trade Center 'Two Occurrences' Decision,
INS. COvERAGE L. BuLL. Feb. 2005, 1, 1 (discussing how the court's ruling could result in
over $1 billion dollars more coverage to rebuild).
2. World Trade Ctr. Props., L.L.C. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 345 F-3d 154, 158 (2d Cir. 2003).
3. Id.
4. Id.
s. Id. at 158-6o (discussing the course of the litigation).
6. World Trade Ctr. Props. LLC v. Travelers Indem. Co., No. i Civ. 12738, 2002 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 9863, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. June 5, 2002). It is not obvious that the definition on the
contractual form of the parties and the default definition under New York law should yield
different results because both claim to rely on a causation approach. New York's
long-established use of the "unfortunate events" test, see Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v.
Wesolowski, 305 N.E.2d 907, 91o (N.Y. 1973), however, is in actuality a variation within a
general causation approach based on the "liability event" and thus probably yields a
different result. See In re Prudential Lines, Inc., 202 B.R. 13, 22 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1996)
(recognizing "the long line of cases applying the New York law's presumption that the
Ioccurrence' in an insurance context is the underlying event that ultimately results in a filed
claim or claims"); Jon A. Baumunk, Comment, New York's "Unfortunate Event" Test: Its
Application Prior to the Events of 9/11, 39 CAL. W. L. REv. 323 (2003).
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bound to a different definition that treated what happened on September ii as
two occurrences.7
Conflicts over the number of occurrences in an insured event are not
limited to terrorist acts or similarly unique situations. On the contrary,
disputes over the term occur in a wide variety of contexts, including products
liability, 8 environmental damage, 9 employment discrimination,1" automobile
accidents,11 arson, 2 gunshots,13 food poisoning,14 police brutality,"5 and
transportation of goods. 6 The issue can arise any time an insured asset is
involved with multiple injuries to persons or property.
Academic discussion of the approaches to determining the number of
occurrences is sparse. Only a few scholarly works have catalogued the prevalent
doctrines in the case law.17 While several commentaries on the September 11
7. SR Int'l Bus. Ins. Co. v. World Trade Ctr. Props., LLC, 467 F.3d 107, 113-15 (2d Cir. 20o6)
(recounting the history of the litigation and the jury verdict); Paisch, supra note i, at 1. In
particular, the courts found that the "WilProp" contract defined the attacks as one
occurrence while the default principle of background law defined the attacks as two
occurrences. Consequently, the minority of insurers bound by the "WilProp" form paid the
one-occurrence amount while the insurers not so bound paid the amount for two
occurrences. World Trade Ctr., 467 F.3d at 115-16.
8. E.g., Champion Int'l. Corp. v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 546 F.2d 502 (2d Cir. 1976) (defective
paneling); Associated Indem. Corp. v. Dow Chem. Co., 814 F. Supp. 613 (E.D. Mich. 1993)
(defective pipe).
9. E.g., Sunoco, Inc. v. Ill. Nat'l Ins. Co., 226 F. App'x 104 (3 d Cir. 2007).
lo. E.g., Appalachian Ins. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 676 F.2d 56 ( 3d Cir. 1982) (sex
discrimination); Transp. Ins. Co. v. Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 1325 (N.D.
Tex. 1980) (race discrimination).
ii. E.g., Ill. Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Szczepkowicz, 542 N.E.2d 9o (Ill. App. Ct. 1989) (multiple car
accidents).
12. E.g., Lexington Ins. Co. v. Travelers Indem. Co. of Ill., 21 F. App'x 585 (9th Cir. 2001) (four
fires set by an arsonist).
13. E.g., Koikos v. Travelers Ins. Co., 849 So. 2d 263 (Fla. 2003) (multiple gunshots).
14. E.g., Mason y. Home Ins. Co. of Ill., 532 N.E.2d 526 (Il1. App. Ct. 1988) (ill-prepared
onions).
15. E.g., Mead Reinsurance v. Granite State Ins. Co., 873 F.2d 1185 (9 th Cir. 1988) (excessive
force).
16. E.g., Mich. Chem. Corp. v. Am. Home Assurance Co., 728 F.2d 374 (6th Cir. 1984)
(misshipment).
17. The most thorough analysis is provided in Tung Yin, Comment, Nailing Jello to a Wall: A
Uniform Approach for Adjudicating Insurance Coverage Disputes in Products Liability Cases with
Delayed Manifestation Injuries and Damages, 83 CAL. L. REv. 1243 (1995), which distinguishes
and describes four theories and arguing for causation theory. See ROBERT H. JERRY, II,
UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW 335-37 (1987); Arthur J. Liederman, Appendix: Application
of Occurrence/Accident to an Insurer's Limit of Liability and Deductible, in THE COMPREHENSIVE
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litigation appeared in both popular publications and academic journals, none
of these deeply analyzed the multiple occurrence doctrine. 8 No article has
subjected the prominent doctrines to focused theoretical critique and analysis.' 9
This omission is striking because of the importance leading treatises and
casebooks attribute to the issue."
This Note seeks to fill this gap in the literature. It makes three novel
contributions. First, the Note seeks to clarify confusion over how to catalogue
the current doctrines employed by courts2 with a typology and a hypothetical
example that highlights the differences among the theories. Second, it criticizes
the ascendant causation theory on both transsubstantive and normative
grounds. The Note therefore avoids two of the defects of existing criticism of
the causation theory. Existing scholarship has primarily focused on particular
cases and, as a result, has only criticized the specific application of the causation
theory to a set of facts.2" This Note's critique, however, compares and contrasts
GENERAL LIABILITY POLICY: A CRITIQUE OF SELECTED PROVISIONS 113 (Arthur J. Liederman
ed., 1985); Francis J. Maloney III, The Application of "Per-Occurrence" Deductible Provisions in
First-Party Property Claims, 37 TORT & INS. L.J. 921 (2002) (distinguishing and describing
three different occurrence theories); Sharon Abidor, Note, Traveling Outside the Insurance
Contract; The Problems with Maximizing Victim Compensation: Koikos v. Travelers Insurance
Company, io CONN. INS. L.J. 349 (2004) (distinguishing and describing two different
occurrence theories and critiquing the application of the causation theory).
18. E.g., Desmond Keith Derrington, Occurrences: The World Trade Center Insurance Question, 13
IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 831 (2003) (providing an international perspective on the
occurrence question); Jeffrey W. Stempel, The Insurance Aftermath of September 11: Myriad
Claims, Multiple Lines, Arguments over Occurrence Counting, War Risk Exclusions, the Future of
Terrorism Coverage, and New Issues of Government Role, 37 TORT & INS. L.J. 817, 844-45
(2002); Paisch, supra note 1; Baumunk, supra note 6.
ig. The most prominent piece is representative: focusing on delayed manifestation injuries, it
catalogues the four different theories used by courts and accepts with only limited argument
the increasing trend toward use of the causation theory. See Yin, supra note 17.
20. See KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, INSURANCE LAW AND REGULATION 436-44 (3d ed. 2000)
(devoting a section to the number of occurrences issue); TOM BAKER, INSURANCE LAW AND
POLICY 2-3 (2003) (mentioning the occurrence issue as a means to discuss the interpretation
of insurance contracts); MALCOLM A. CLARKE, THE LAW OF INSURANCE CONTRACTS
§ 17-4C3, at 488-95 (5th ed. 2006) (devoting a section to the number of occurrences issue in
British law); INSURANCE DISPUTES § 4.16o, at 104-05 (Lord Justice Mance, lain Goldrein &
Robert Merkin eds., 2d ed. 2003) (devoting one paragraph to the number of occurrences
issue in British law); BARRY R. OSTRAGER & THOMAS R. NEWMAN, HANDBOOK ON
INSURANCE COVERAGE DISPUTES (14 th ed. 2008) (devoting a section to the number of
occurrences issue).
21. See Maloney, supra, note 17 (distinguishing three theories); Abidor, supra note 17
(distinguishing two theories); Yin, supra note 17 (distinguishing four theories).
22. E.g., Maloney, supra note 17 (property claims); Stempel, supra note 18 (terrorism); Abidor,
supra note 17 (negligence).
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outcomes in a wide-ranging series of cases to make a larger point regarding the
impossibility of consistent adjudication in insurance disputes under the
causation theory. Previous critiques also have not relied on the familiar concept
of proximate causation and its connections both to normative responsibility
and understandings of human decisionmaking to ground their analysis.
The final and primary contribution of this Note is an independence-based
proposal for the definition of occurrence. No scholar has advanced such a
proposal: all other scholarship argues in favor of a particular variation of the
causation theory" or for an outcome under a particular variation. 4 The Note
argues for an independence approach on the basis of normative analysis of the
economics of the insurance system and of appeals to judicial economy.
Specifically, the independence approach better comports with the intent of the
parties. It also provides an objective criterion that reduces the inconsistent
outcomes and the opportunities for outcome-based judging plaguing the
causation approach. This economics-based argument contrasts strongly with
the existing scholarly defenses of the causation theory, which focus largely on
outcome, such as privileging victims or addressing a certain type of injury.2"
The Note, therefore, is also original in extending economic analysis- common
in insurance law 6 - to the occurrence issue.
A brief comment on the property versus liability insurance distinction is
important before proceeding. Despite the reference to property insurance
regarding the VTC case, this Note generally focuses on liability, and not
property, insurance. The same arguments apply, however, to property
insurance, albeit in somewhat different terms. To be sure, some commentators
distinguish between property and liability insurance when analyzing
occurrence theories. They reason that payouts for liability insurance are
unlimited and compensate unsuspecting tort victims whereas payouts for
property insurance are limited to land value and compensate individuals
choosing to own and insure property. 7 This reasoning, however, is flawed on a
23. E.g., Yin, supra note 17 (arguing for the proximate cause variation).
24. E.g., Abidor, supra note 17 (arguing that the court improperly applied the proximate cause
variation); see, e.g., sources cited supra note 22.
25. See sources cited supra note 17.
26. See, e.g., BAKER, supra note 20 (discussing economic incentives throughout the portrayal of
insurance law).
27. See Abidor, supra note 17, at 350 n.4. ("First, unlike a property insurance risk, there is no
natural limit on a liability insurance risk.... Second, unlike property insurance benefits,
liability insurance benefits go to victims who had no choice over the amount or kind of
insurance purchased by the person or entity that harmed them." (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
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number of grounds. First, it is countertextual: the contracts in both areas are
often similar, if not identical 8.2 Since insurance is a contract-based field, and
textual intentions matter in contract interpretation,2 9 this similarity matters.
Second, the assumptions of insurance- such as independence of insured events
and information availability-are the same in both types of cases. In other
words, there is no reason to think that different background principles underlie
the different insurance systems. Third, while liability insurance addresses
unlimited losses, the ability to calculate average losses and a loss distribution is
more important for the operation of insurance: unpredictable and large losses
can be insured as long as their distribution is known. There is no reason,
consequently, to think that a different occurrence conception is needed to
address this difference. In any event, the rise of aggregate caps in liability
insurance renders this difference moot. Finally, the distinction presumes that
insurance contract interpretation should care about distributional justice at the
expense of consistency and efficiency because it privileges tort victims-who
cannot purchase insurance-by maximizing their recovery. But contractual
interpretation traditionally relies on the intent of the specific parties, not
universal utilitarian concerns better addressed by mandatory insurance
requirements, as for automobile insurance or social safety net policy.
Consequently, this Note rejects such a distinction between property and
liability insurance for the limited purpose of interpreting the occurrence
concept. Courts, however, appear divided on this point."0
The Note proceeds in four Parts. Part I provides a brief overview of
insurance and the concepts relevant for later analysis. Part II describes the two
theories of occurrence prevalent in the case law, focusing on the ascendant
causation theory and its two variations. Part III critiques these theories from
28. Compare Newmont Mines Ltd. v. Hanover Ins. Co., 784 F.2d 127, 135 (2d Cir. 1986)
(interpreting a property policy reading that the insurer "shall not be liable for more than its
proportion of $1,ooo,ooo excess of loss of $500,000 for any one occurrence in addition to
the deductible under the primary insurance [$25,000] ... by any of the perils insured
hereunder"), and JEFFREY M. STEMPEL, STEMPEL ON INSURANCE CONTRACTS § 15.03(F), at
15-6o.1 (2009) (summarizing the Insurance Services Office (ISO) standard property form
language and stating that "the most we will pay for loss or damage in any one occurrence"),
with INS. SERVS. OFFICE, INC., COMMERCiAL GENERAL LIABILITY COVERAGE FORM (CG oo O
07 98), at 4 [hereinafter CGL COVERAGE FORM], reprinted in BAKER, supra note 20, at 413,
416 (setting forth the general occurrence requirement).
ag. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 201-203 (1981).
30. Compare Royal Indem. Co. v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 516 F.2d 1O67 (9th Cir.
1975) (relying on a liability insurance causation test in a property insurance context), with
Newmont Mines Ltd. v. Hanover Ins. Co., 784 F.2d 127 (2d Cir. 1986) (distinguishing
between property and liability insurance).
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both external and internal perspectives, arguing that the variations are
internally incoherent, that courts choose between the variations without
principle, and that courts apply the variations inconsistently. Part IV proposes
a different theory for the definition of occurrence based on the concept of
independence. It details the types of inquiries required by an independence
test, discusses the sources of the data necessary for such inquiries, and
addresses counterarguments to an independence test. The final Part provides
examples of independence analysis and describes the clarifying impact of an
independence test on current doctrine and cases.
I. THE INSURANCE SYSTEM
Insurance is widespread in the modern world and has existed in some form
since ancient times." While the modern insurance system is technical and
complex, its basic functioning is consistent and its terms are often
standardized.32 This Part will briefly describe how insurance works and define
several relevant concepts.
A. Brief Overview ofBackground Concepts
Insurance increases societal welfare because of the phenomenon of risk
aversion.33 Demand for insurance arises because individuals are risk averse with
regard to losses: they prefer a certain loss to the risk of a greater loss even when
the average loss is the same for both.34 Individuals, therefore, routinely pay
insurance premiums that are equal to or less than the average loss plus their
risk premium to avoid the chance, however small, of disastrous loss.
In order to capitalize on risk aversion, insurance systems rely on the "law of
large numbers. ''3' The law of large numbers provides that the actual loss of the
members of a group becomes more predictable as the number of individuals in
the group increases. 36 In more technical terms, the probability density function
decreases as the number of observations increases. This increased predictability
31. JERRY, supra note 17, at 16-18 (summarizing the history of insurance).
32. BAKER, supra note 20, at 410 (stating that two forms of "these [standardized] liability
insurance policies provide the basic non-automobile tort liability insurance coverage for
most people and businesses in the United States").
33- BAKER, supra note 20, at 2-3.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 3.
36. Id.
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allows an insurance company that provides insurance for many individuals in
its risk pool to predict with relative certainty the actual loss of its insured
individuals. The company, therefore, can know what amount of reserves it
needs to make the payouts and, consequently, what amount it must charge in
premiums.37 As described above, risk-averse individuals prefer these premiums
to the equivalent gamble.
The operation of the law of large numbers in the insurance context assumes
that adverse outcomes are independent, or uncorrelated 8 In other words, the
insurance system assumes that the probability that one individual suffers an
adverse outcome is not affected in any way by the outcome of another
individual.3 9 This assumption explains the traditional war exclusion from
insurance coverage: losses in war are highly correlated.4 °
B. The Occurrence Concept
Modern insurance contracts are largely standardized due to the work of the
Insurance Services Office, Inc., an industry group.4 ' The Commercial General
Liability (CGL) policy is the basic statement of terms for commercial entities.42
Nearly identical provisions appear in many homeowners' policies.43 While
37. Of course, insurance regulators also specify minimum reserves. E.g., N.Y. INS. LAW § 1305
(McKinney 2008) ("Every authorized insurer shall ... maintain reserves equal to the
unearned portions of the gross premiums charged on unexpired or unterminated risks and
policies.").
38. MICHAEL G. FAURE & TON HARTLIEF, 5 INSURANCE AND EXPANDING SYSTEMIC RISKS 109
(2003) ("[T]he requirement that the risks in the pool should be uncorrelated, is equally
important. This simply has to do with a basic insurance requirement that the realization of
one risk may not at the same time cause the realization of other insured risks as well.");
DAVID S. MOORE & GEORGE P. MCCABE, INTRODUCTION TO THE PRACTICE OF STATISTICS 321-
23 (4th ed. 2003) (recounting the other assumptions: the availability of accurate information
to the insurer and the continuation of past patterns).
39. MOORE & MCCABE, supra note 38, at 295 (discussing the joint probability of independent
events).
40. Stempel, supra note 18, at 844-45 (noting that war losses are highly correlated); CGL
COVERAGE FORM, supra note 28 (modern war exclusion).
41. The ISO supplies data and support services as well. See generally ISO, http://www.iso.com
(last visited May 4, 2009).
42. INS. SERVS. OFFICE, INC., COMMERCIAL GENERAL LIABILITY DECLARATIONS (CG 00 90 01 95)
reprinted in BAKER, supra note 20, at 411; CGL COVERAGE FORM, supra note 28, reprinted in
BAKER, supra note 20.
43. ABRAHAM, supra note 20, at 167 (reprinting a sample homeowner's policy).
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variations exist, focusing on the standard text is useful for the majority of
cases.44
Since approximately 1980, insurance has been provided largely on a
"per-occurrence," as opposed to a "per-claim," basis.45 Per-claim insurance
provides recovery up to the policy limit for every claim filed against the
insured. Per-occurrence coverage, on the other hand, provides recovery up to
the policy limit for every occurrence, regardless of the number of claims filed
against the insured. This difference matters when there are numerous claims
for two reasons. First, recovery under a per-occurrence policy may not cover
the total value of all the claims if all of the claims arise from only one
occurrence. As a result, either the insured will have to pay out-of-pocket the
difference between the total value of the claims and the occurrence limit, or, if
the insured lacks the resources to pay these claims, claims holders will go
uncompensated. Second, the insured will have to pay out-of-pocket multiple
deductibles if the multiple claims arise out of multiple occurrences. Thus, if
each claim is less than the deductible and each claim arose from a separate
occurrence, the insured's policy will not cover any of the losses.
It follows from this analysis that the finding of one or multiple occurrences
is neither universally pro-insured nor pro-insurer. The interests of the parties
depend on the interaction of a- number of variables, including the deductible
amount, the value of each claim, the per-occurrence limit, and the value of the
sum of the claims. 46 Some generalizations, however, can be made. For
example, insurers prefer a finding of multiple occurrences when there are
multiple claims each of which is less than the deductible, while insured
individuals prefer a finding of one occurrence in the same situation. When each
claim is greater than the deductible, the preferences will vary depending on the
difference between the claims and deductibles, the sum of the losses, and the
occurrence limit. The following Table summarizes the decisions. In practice,
insurers and insured parties often take inconsistent positions in different cases
because of the change in their interest in the pending litigation.47
44. Yin, supra note 17, at 1247 n.24.
45. See JERRY, supra note 17, at 333-35.
46. Aggregate limits also often matter. An aggregate limit can cap coverage if the per-occurrence
value is particularly high. This discussion assumes no aggregate limit for the sake of
simplicity. Aggregate limits are increasingly common, but they are not universal. See World
Trade Ctr. Props., L.L.C. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 345 F.3d 154 (2d Cir. 2003).
47. See Stempel, supra note 18, at 835 (noting that policyholders do not have a universal interest
regarding the number of occurrences).
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Table i
Insurer will always want
multiple occurrences because
(IC)-TD is always less than
(JC)-D for positive deductibles.
The standardized CGL policy provides a definition for occurrence in the
face of these conflicting preferences. It provides that an occurrence is "an
accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same
general harmful conditions." 49 The focus of the definition is the term
"accident." s This term, however, does not provide much guidance in deciding
whether one or multiple occurrences exist and allows for the doctrinal
variations explored in the next Part. The definition's ambiguity results from
inattention to the issue in the drafting process, perhaps because of focus on
other issues, such as the exclusion of coverage for intentional losses by choice
48. This Table makes it appear that insurers want multiple occurrences, but a disproportionate
share of the situations fall in the top right box because deductibles tend to be less than the
loss in order to justify obtaining insurance.
49. CGL COVERAGE FORM, supra note 28, at 12, reprinted in BAKER, supra note 20, at 424.
50. See EUGENE R. ANDERSON, JORDAN S. STANZLER & LORELIE S. MASTERS, INSURANCE
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of the term accident and the inclusion of coverage for latent injuries like
environmental and asbestos damage."1 The multiple occurrence issue simply
was not addressed.
II. CURRENT THEORIES OF OCCURRENCE
Several approaches for defining the term occurrence have emerged in the
case law. 2 Most courts look to the cause of the loss. These courts diverge,
however, on whether to define cause as the proximate cause of the victim's
injury or as the event causing the insured's liability. Still other courts define
occurrence by reference to the effects of the situation. 3
A. Causation Theories
The dominant view is that each occurrence must have its own cause. 4
Courts differ, however, with respect to how to define cause, splitting into two
camps."
51. Id.
52. See Appalachian Ins. Co. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 863 N.E.Ed 994, 998 (N.Y. 2007)
(acknowledging the proximate cause, effects, and liability event approaches); Herbert J.
Baumann, Broad Form Property Liability Coverage: An Overview, in REFERENCE HANDBOOK
ON THE COMPREHENSIVE GENERAL LIABILITY POLICY: COVERAGE PROVISIONS, EXCLUSIONS,
AND OTHER LITIGATION ISSUES 117, 123-24 (PeterJ. Neeson ed., 1995).
3. 'Of course, for property damage there is no liability event because the insured is not liable:
this variation does not exist for property damage policies, although some courts speak of
coverage events. E.g., SR Int'l Bus. Ins. Co. v. World Trade Ctr. Props., LLC, 467 F.3 d 107
(2d Cir. 2006).
54. E.g., Yin, supra note 17, at 1249.
55. Koikos v. Travelers Ins. Co., 849 So. 2d 263, 269 (Fla. 2003) (distinguishing between
liability event and proximate cause views, albeit with other language). As one court
summarized,
[D]ecided cases are imprecise guides, in an event, for unless particular words have
crystallized into a definite legal rule their meaning necessarily varies with time,
place, occasion and the vocabulary of the user. Nor is an all-inclusive definition of
accident or occurrence possible or any formulation of a test applicable in every case,
for the word has been employed in a number of senses and given varying meanings
depending on the relevant context.
Home Ins. Co. v. Aetna Cas. Co., 1977 Fire & Casualty Cas. (CCH), 9, 13 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
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1. Proximate Cause Theory
Many courts hold the view that each occurrence must have a separate
proximate cause. These courts find that all damages resulting from one
proximate, uninterrupted, and continuing cause stems from a single
occurrence. 6 Proximate cause, of course, is "the limitation which the courts
have placed upon the actor's responsibility for the consequences of the actor's
conduct."5 7 The assessment is based on reasonableness.
58
The leading case for the proximate cause variation is Appalachian Insurance
Co. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co.59 In that case, the Third Circuit applied the
"cause theory" and inquired as to whether "there was but one proximate,
uninterrupted, and continuing cause which resulted in all of the injuries and
damage. ,6 The dispute arose when Liberty Mutual sought indemnification for
its settlement of a class action sex discrimination suit brought by its female
employees.6 1 Since there was a $25,000 deductible for each occurrence, the
insurer argued that the discrimination constituted multiple occurrences. 62 The
court, however, affirmed the district court's finding that there "was but one
occurrence" because "[t]he injuries for which Liberty was liable all resulted
from a common source: Liberty's discriminatory employment policies. ' '6 3 It
found irrelevant that "there were multiple injuries and that they were of
different magnitudes and that injuries extended over a period of time" because
"[a]s long as the injuries stem from one proximate cause there is a single
occurrence." 64 The proximate causation view has been extended to numerous
56. This language is oft-repeated. See, e.g., Koikos, 849 So. 2d at 273; Truck Ins. Exch. v. Rohde,
303 P.2d 659, 663 (Wash. 1956) (en banc).
57. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 41, at 264 (5th ed.
1984).
58. Id.
59. 676 F.2d 56 (3d Cit. 1982); see Yin, supra note 17, at 1249-50 ("Perhaps the most commonly
cited case for this proposition is Appalachian ... ").
6o. Appalachian, 676 F.2d at 61 (quoting Bartholomew v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 502 F. Supp. 246,
251 (D.R.I. 1980)).
61. Id.
62. Id. While this ruling was pro-insured in that it rejected the insurer's arguments, the court
ultimately ruled that the insurer did not have to cover the losses because the occurrence
postdated the beginning of coverage. Id. at 63.
63. Id. at 61.
64. Id. (emphasis added). It should be noted that the court used the extended exposure part of
the definition to conclude that "the definition of the term 'occurrence' in the Appalachian
policy contemplates that one occurrence may have multiple and disparate impacts on
individuals and that injuries may extend over a period of time." Id.
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areas,6" including toxic contamination and products liability, 66 and also has
been supported by several scholars.67
2. Liability Event Theory
Other courts hold that each event that gives rise to liability for the insured
constitutes an occurrence. These courts look to whether the liability arose from
one or multiple acts.68
The leading case for the liability event theory is Michigan Chemical Corp. v.
American Home Assurance Co. 69 In that case, the Sixth Circuit began by
agreeing with the "vast majority of courts," including the court in Appalachian
Insurance, that "the number of occurrences for purposes of applying coverage
limitations is determined by referring to the cause or causes of the damage and
not to the number of injuries or claims."' The court, however, diverged from
the reasoning of Appalachian Insurance by holding that each misshipment of a
toxic flame retardant, instead of a feed supplement, to a feed distributor
constituted a separate occurrence because "[t]he shipment of the substance
constituted the act from which liability arose."" It ignored the single act of
65. Sunoco, Inc. v. Ill. Nat. Ins. Co., 226 F. App'x 104 (3 d Cir. 2007) (toxic contamination);
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Treesdale Inc., 418 F. 3d 330 (3d Cir. 2005) (asbestos); Chemstar,
Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 41 F. 3 d 429 (9 th Cir. 1994) (failure to warn); Associated
Indem. Corp. v. Dow Chem. Co., 814 F. Supp. 613, (E.D. Mich. 1993) (defective pipe);
Transp. Ins. Co. v. Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 1325 (D. Tex. 198o) (deciding
that a pattern of racial discrimination is one occurrence because it comes from one policy).
66. As these examples imply, courts have been willing to use the proximate cause theory to find
continuous processes to be one occurrence. See Maloney, supra note 17, at 929.
67. See Yin, supra note 17, at 1256-6o (arguing that proximate cause view comports with an
original understanding of the CGL form's shift to an occurrence policy and reduces
litigation by joining lawsuits together).
68. As the following examples demonstrate, the results of applying this theory often are the
same as those from applying an effect theory. One commentator is right to comment that in
some cases a "court applie[s] an effect theory analysis and label[s] it causation theory."
Abidor, supra note 17, at 366.
69. 728 F.2d 374 (6th Cit. 1984); see Yin, supra note 17, at 1252.
70. Mich. Chem. Corp., 728 F.2d at 379.
71. Id. at 383. The feed distributor mixed what it thought was feed supplement with regular
feed and distributed it to farmers. Tens of thousands of farm animals had to be destroyed as
a result of the contamination, and hundreds of claims ensued. Michigan Chemical had total
liability coverage, including excess layers, of $28 million per occurrence. Several of the
insurers argued that there was only one occurrence, the accidental shipment, while
Michigan Chemical and another insurer argued that each claim constituted a separate
occurrence.
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mislabeling underlying all of the misshipments on the grounds that
mislabeling alone does not give rise to liability. This conclusion is the
equivalent of the Appalachian Insurance court holding that each implementation
of the discriminatory policy constituted a separate occurrence on the grounds
that an unenforced policy is not actionable.7 2 Despite this difference, the
Michigan Chemical court's decision, like the ruling in Appalachian Insurance,
was pro-insured: it doubled the coverage for Michigan Chemical to $56
million, well above the $45 million in claims owed to injured farmers.
73
The liability event view is also employed in the products liability context.
In Maurice Pincoffs Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co., the Fifth Circuit
decided that an importer's distribution of contaminated birdseed to U.S.
dealers eight times constituted eight occurrences. 74 The court disagreed with
the district court's finding of only one occurrence- the contamination of the
seed-"because it was the contaminated seed that caused the damage.""5 Since
the term occurrence should refer to "the occurrence of the events or incidents
for which Pincoffs is liable" and "[i] t was the sale of the contaminated seed for
which Pincoffs was liable," the court found one occurrence for each sale.76 This
ruling doubled the amount the primary insurer had to pay, although it is not
necessarily a pro-insured ruling because an umbrella insurer may have covered
the remainder.7 7 Other courts have followed the lead of Michigan Chemical and
Pincoffs .
8
72. These first two theories should converge in products liability, where there is only one cause
(the product being defective) and one event that gives rise to liability (the defective product
gives rise to a class action). As noted below, however, some courts disagree in the
application of this approach to products liability. See infra Section III.A.
73. Mich. Chem. Corp., 728 F.2d at 376.
74. 447 F.2d 204 (5th Cir. 1971).
75. Id. at 206.
76. Id. While one commentator believes that Michigan Chemical and Pincoffs are two different
approaches, the former based on liability from the point of view of the insured and the latter
based on liability from the point of view of the injured, see Yin, supra note 17, at 1254-56, this
distinction ignores the fact that in both cases each separate cause of action - misshipment or
sale -was considered a separate occurrence. The commentator also ignores a key difference
between the two cases: one is a negligence case and the other is a products liability case.
77. Pincoffs, 447 F.2d at 205-06.
78. E.g., U.E. Texas One-Barrington, Ltd. v. Gen. Star Indem. Co., 332 F.3d 274 (Sth Cit. 2003)
(citing Pincoffs); H.E. Butt Grocery Co. v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa., 15o
F.3d 526, 530 (5th Cit. 1998) (citing Michigan Chemical); Interstate Fire & Cas. Co. v.
Archdiocese of Portland in Or., 35 F. 3d 1325 (9th Cir. 1994) (finding four separate instances
of child abuse to be four occurrences); Irving Materials, Inc. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., No.
1:03-CV-361, 2007 WL 1035098, at *18 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 30, 2007) (citing Michigan
Chemical); Mason v. Home Ins. Co. of Ill., 532 N.E.2d 526, 529 (Ill. App. 1988) (citing
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B. Effect Theories
A small minority of courts reject the causation theory wholesale and instead
define occurrence with respect to "effects." These courts view each injury as a
separate occurrence. In Elston-Richards Storage Co. v. Indemnity Insurance Co. of
North America, for example, Elston-Richards negligently damaged thousands
of appliances with a faulty carton-clamp on a truck.79 The court found that
"[a]lthough the damage to each appliance may have resulted from a single
cause, that is, the manner in which the new clamp assembly on the new lift
truck was operated, the damage to each appliance was a separate accident and
therefore 'one event or occurrence."'' 8, In contrast to the liability event theory,
each new injury in the effect theory need not serve as an independent basis for
liability giving rise to a separate cause of action. Other courts have ruled
similarly.1
C. A Hypothetical Example
A hypothetical example helps to clarify the distinctions among these three
theories. Consider the case of an importer of animal medicines who distributes
these medicines to dealers across the country. The importer receives twelve
drugs in the mail, labeled A through L, and needs to send them to twelve
corresponding dealers, named A through L. Due to a policy of not operating
lights in the warehouse to save electricity, the importer accidentally sends the
wrong drug to each dealer: no dealer receives the correct drug. The dealers, not
realizing the mistake, distribute the medicines to ten farmers each and many
animals die as a result. Numerous claims ensue against the importer.
The prevailing theories differ in their treatment of this situation. A court
using the proximate cause theory would trace the losses to the importer's
lights-out policy, which is arguably the root cause of all of these losses.
Michigan Chemical). New York's unfortunate event test is also a version of this approach. See
Baumunk, supra note 6, at 328 (calling New York's liability event view a "variant of the
,cause' test"). It should be noted that there are some differences within this theory, which
will be discussed below in Section III.A. Some courts have found products liability to be one
occurrence while others have found each sale to be an occurrence. Compare Champion Int'l
Corp. v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 546 F.2d 502 (2d Cir. 1976) (finding that the installation of
defective paneling constitutes one occurrence), with Irving Materials, 2007 WL 1035098
(finding that each sale of defective concrete constitutes a separate occurrence).
79. 194 F. Supp. 673 (W.D. Mich. 196o), affd per curiam, 291 F.2d 627 (6th Cir. 1961). For a
discussion of these decisions, see Yin, supra note 17, at 1253-54.
80. Elston-Richards Storage, 194 F. Supp. at 682.
81. See, e.g., Reynolds v. S & D Foods, Inc., 822 F. Supp. 705 (D. Kan. 1993).
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Consequently, a court using that approach would find one occurrence. The
liability event theory, however, focuses on the event that gives rise to the
insured's liability. Since having a lights-out policy does not by itself give rise to
liability, a court would give weight to the fact that each misshipment gives rise
to a new cause of action. Thus, a court would find twelve occurrences. Finally,
a court applying the effect theory would consider the actual injuries. A court
using this approach would find 120 occurrences-the number of farmers
receiving each medicine and suffering losses. In theory, a court could break
down the analysis even further and consider the number of injured animals.
III.CRITIOUING THE CAUSATION THEORY
Two problems plague the majority causation approach to the number of
occurrences issue.82 First, the causation approach yields inconsistent results.
Different courts find different numbers of causes, and thus different numbers
of occurrences, for strikingly similar fact patterns. The inconsistency occurs
both when courts apply, sometimes unconsciously, different variations of the
causation approach and when they apply the same variation of the causation
approach. Second, courts routinely strain the concept of proximate causation.
They often find one cause in a way that eliminates proximate causation's
connotation of responsibility and replaces it with but-for causation's simplistic
logic. Courts also often find multiple causes in a way that inaccurately captures
the seamlessness of much of human action and decisionmaking.
A. The Inconsistency of the Causation Theory
Courts have applied the causation theory to strikingly similar fact patterns
with noticeably different outcomes.8 ' The first source of inconsistency stems
from the different variations of the causation approach. This variation is both
conscious and unconscious: courts often claim to be applying the proximate
cause view but in effect apply the liability event view. Regardless, differences
between the variations prompt inconsistent results. s
82. This Note focuses on the causation approaches and its variations because so few courts rely
on the effects theory. See OSTRAGER & NEWMAN, supra note 20, § 9.02, at 627 ("In an older
line of cases still followed in a minority of jurisdictions, courts use an effects-oriented
approach.").
83. One commentator has likened trying to develop a coherent theory of court decisions in this
area to "the proverbial task of nailing jello to a wall." Yin, supra note 17, at 1246.
84. Property damage cases have no such inconsistency because there is no liability event theory
there. They only have inconsistency within the proximate cause theory.
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In both Pincoffs and Associated Indemnity Corp. v. Dow Chemical Co.,8s for
example, the insured sold a defective product and the courts claimed to apply a
proximate causation standard. The court in Pincoffs, discussed above, held that
each sale of contaminated birdseed constituted a separate occurrence because
"[i]t was the sale of the contaminated seed for which Pincoffs was liable.
8 6
The court in Dow Chemical, on the other hand, referred to the "one, proximate,
uninterrupted, and continuing cause" test and held that the production, not
distribution, of defective resin was the cause of the loss. 87 The Pincoffis court in
effect, if not in intent, applied a liability event standard and found multiple
occurrences, while the Dow Chemical court applied the proximate cause
variation and found one occurrence. Despite this divergence, in both cases the
courts' ruling was pro-insured: the court rejected the number of occurrences
sought by the insurers.
Two cases arising from asbestos liability provide an even more striking
example because the defective product was the same in both cases. In
Appalachian Insurance Co. v. General Electric Co., the court held that each
asbestos exposure constituted a separate occurrence by applying the equivalent
of the liability event approach, "the unfortunate-event approach, which is
based not solely on the cause but on the nature of the incident giving rise to
damages., 8 8 In Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Treesdale, Inc., on the other
hand, the court ruled that similar facts constituted only one occurrence on
proximate cause grounds s.8  Despite finding conflicting numbers of
occurrences, in both cases courts imposed liability on the asbestos
manufacturer, not the excess insurer. Similar inconsistencies exist in other fact
situations.9"
85. 814 F. Supp. 613 (E.D. Mich. 1993).
86. 447 F.2d 204, 2o6 (5th Cir. 1971).
87. 814 F. Supp. at 621.
88. 863 N.E. 2d 994, 998 (N.Y. 2007); see also Stonewall Ins. Co. v. Asbestos Claims Mgmt.
Corp., 73 F.3d 1178 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding that each asbestos installation constitutes a
separate occurrence under relevant state law); Plastics Eng'g Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co.,
466 F. Supp. 2d 1071 (E.D. Wis. 2006) (same).
89. 418 F.3d 330 (3 d Cir. 2005); see also Owens-Ill., Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 597 F. Supp.
1515, 1527 (D.D.C. 1984) (holding that the manufacture and sale of asbestos-containing
products constitutes single occurrence).
go. Compare H.E. Butt Grocery Co. v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa., iSo F. 3 d 526
(5 th Cir. 1998) (holding that two abuses by the same individual are two occurrences under a
liability event view), with State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Elizabeth N., 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d 327
(Ct. App. 1992) (holding that multiple abuses by same individual are one occurrence under
a proximate cause view).
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Furthermore, courts reach inconsistent results even when applying the
same variation of the causation approach. In Pincoffs and Champion
International Corp. v. Continental Casualty Co.,9' for example, both courts
applied the liability event view, but they treated the existence of separate
shipments differently. The Pincoffs court held that each of eight different
shipments constituted a separate occurrence. 92 The court in Champion,
however, held that twenty-six separate shipments of 1400 separate sales of
paneling that turned out to be defective constituted one occurrence because of
the similarity of the "underlying circumstances which resulted in the claim for
damages."' 3 This ruling self-consciously maximized coverage: the Champion
court noted that a ruling of one occurrence created coverage for $1.1 million of
$1.6 million in damages while a ruling of multiple occurrence meant "there is
no liability under the [insurance] policy." 94 In effect, the Champion court
decided that each class action constitutes one occurrence because one event led
to the class action liability,9 while the Pincoffs court decided that each member
of a potential class action counted as a separate occurrence because each victim
gave rise to more liability.9 6 Both courts, however, ruled in a way that
maximized coverage for the insured.
Just as courts reach inconsistent results under the liability event view, they
often rule inconsistently when applying the proximate cause view. In Arizona
Property & Casualty Insurance Guaranty Fund v. Helme97 and Aetna Casualty &
Surety Co. v. Medical Protective Co., 9 for example, the courts applied a
proximate cause view to medical negligence cases involving multiple mistakes
that resulted in injury to the patient. But,. the court in Helme found two
occurrences - treating each mistake as a contributing cause99 - while the court
in Medical Protective found one occurrence - ignoring the presence of numerous
contributing causes.100 In Helme, the court credited the fact that there were
91. 546 F.2d 502, 506 (2d Cir. 1976).
92. Maurice Pincoffs Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 447 F.2d 204, 207 ( 5th Cir. 1971).
93. 546 F.2d at 505-06.
94. Id.
95. 546 F.2d at 506; see Yin, supra note 17, at 1256-58.
96. 447 F.2d at 205.
97. 735 P.2d 451, 458 (Ariz. 1987).
98. 575 F. Supp. 9o (N.D. Ill. 1983).
99. 735 P.2d at 458.
100. 575 F. Supp. at 903; see RLI Ins. Co. v. Simon's Rock Early CoIl., 765 N.E.2d 247 (Mass.
App. Ct. 2002) (holding that numerous separate acts of negligence constituted one
occurrence because all resulted in one shooting rampage by a troubled student).
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multiple "diagnostic failures" on "separate days" and ignored the insurer's
argument that this view implied that "each and every time any doctor saw or
examined a patient, such failure to accurately re-diagnose the condition would
constitute a separate occurrence."'' This ruling doubled the amount the
insurer had to pay, extending coverage to the victim's family. In Medical
Protective, by contrast, the court ignored the fact that there were multiple
"opportunities" for the physician to prevent the injury by reevaluating his
treatment course, rejecting the insurer's argument that each doctor's visit
constituted an occurrence."°2 Thus, the courts rejected the insurer's argument
in both cases - in the end maximizing coverage for the injured party - but
arrived at the opposite number of occurrences for strikingly similar fact
patterns."°3
Inconsistency of the same sOrt -identical fact patterns resulting in different
numbers of occurrences under the proximate cause view- even plagued one
court's multipart holding in a case of child molestation. The court in State Farm
Fire & Casualty Co. v. Elizabeth N. in effect argued that negligent supervision of
the perpetrator constituted both one occurrence and multiple occurrences,
depending on whether it affected one child or multiple children.1 4 In that case,
a daycare provider's spouse abused numerous children on numerous occasions.
The court held that "the insured's liability to each child was one occurrence
because each child's injuries resulted from repeated exposure to substantially
the same general conditions."'0° The court argued that "[e]ven if each injury
Byron [the abusing spouse] inflicted on a child resulted from a new negligent
act by Lynn [the daycare provider], each act of negligence by Lynn was
substantially the same-a failure to care for and supervise the child
adequately. ' 06 The inconsistency in the court's conclusion arises from its
failure to apply the same reasoning to the child abuse across multiple children
in the case-while each new act required more negligence, the same "general
conditions" were the cause of abuse of multiple children. There is no principled
way, other than providing recovery for each child, to argue that each child
101. 735 P.2d at 458.
102. 575 F. Supp. at 903.
103. To be sure, Medical Protective involved one physician while Helme involved two surgeons.
The Helme court, however, did not emphasize this difference, focusing instead, like the
Medical Protective court, on the number of diagnostic failures.
104. 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d 327 (Ct. App. 1992).
1OS. Id. at 328.
lO6. Id. at 330.
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constituted a separate occurrence without also arguing that all of the children
constituted one occurrence.
The inconsistency within the causation approach may arise from several
sources. First, courts often express a desire to interpret insurance contracts in
ways that benefit the insured or the victim. 10 7 Since the sympathetic parties
lack a consistent preference on the occurrence issue,'0o judicial desire to benefit
the injured parties results in different outcomes. As one commentator
summarizes, "If there is a common theme in the decisions, it may be that the
courts generally have resolved the issue by adopting a view of the number of
occurrences that maximizes coverage for the insured."" 9 Second, different
courts may approach the occurrence issue from a different level of generality.
As another commentator analogizes, "the crews of a submarine and of ships
which are attacked and sunk in a convoy would no doubt regard each attack
and sinking as a separate occurrence," while "[a]n admiral at Naval
Headquarters might regard the whole attack and its results as one
occurrence.""0
107. Scott E. Harrington & Patricia M. Danzon, The Economics of Liability Insurance, in
HANDBOOK OF INSURANCE 277, 293 (Georges Dionne ed., 2000) (discussing contra
proferentem- that is, construal against the drafter).
1o8. See supra Table i.
1o9. Paisch, supra note i, at 3. This commentator finds this desire consistent with the hornbook
preference for interpreting an ambiguous contract against the drafters, contra proferentem.
Not all courts, and few of the courts cited in this Note, however, admit to using this canon
of interpretation and instead prefer to claim that the insurance language is clear. See 2 ALLAN
D. WINDT, INSURANCE CLAiMS & DISPUTES § 11.24 (5th ed. 2007); Maloney, supra note 17, at
928 (commenting that courts strain in favor of the policyholder under effects theory);
Stempel, supra note 18, at 835 (noting that courts are "moderately pro-policyholder" in
"close cases" on the occurrence issue); Abidor, supra note 17, at 360 (noting that judges "tilt
toward favoring the individual policyholder and providing the greatest amount of coverage
possible"); Michael F. Aylward, Multiple 'Occurrences'-A Divisive Issue, COVERAGE, Jan.-
Feb. 1995, at 39, 39 (noting that "courts will adopt extremely flexible constructions of'cause'
in order to maximize the available coverage"). Of course, courts do not openly construe the
number of occurrences differently depending on whether the occurrence issue has
deductible or policy limit implications. See N. Shipping Co. v. Arkwright Boston Mfrs. Mut.
Ins. Co., 617 F. Supp. 136, 138 (E.D. Pa. 1985) (arguing that the number of occurrences must
be consistent), aff'd, 774 F.2d 1152 (3d Cir. 1985).
110. Derrington, supra note 18, at 842; see Abidor, supra note 17, at 354 (recognizing that "courts
applying the causation test have difficulty determining the proximate cause"). One
commentator believes that appealing to the reasonable expectations of the parties can cabin
judges' discretion, Abidor, supra note 17, at 36o-61, but such a vague theory built on legal
fictions also seems inherently manipulable. This issue will recur later in the discussion of
defining the loss for an independence approach. See supra Subsection IV.A.2.
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B. Straining the Concept of Causation
Courts also routinely analyze the number of causes during the occurrence
determination in ways that strain the concept of causation. In some cases,
judicial analysis of the number of causes undermines the traditional connection
of proximate cause to responsibility. In other cases, judicial analysis conflicts
with the seamlessness of human decisionmaking.
First, the concept of proximate causation often is stretched away from its
traditional connection to responsibility when courts find one cause in
situations of diffused responsibility. Proximate cause as a concept evolved to
address the problem of assigning liability in a world in which multiple
causes-in-fact exist." ' Causes-in-fact, or but-for causes, 1'2 abound for all
events. "3 The building of a house, for example, is strictly speaking a but-for
cause of the arson of the house. But, for obvious reasons,114 it is the arsonist,
not the builder, who is liable for the arson. Proximate cause thus emerged as a
way to limit the liability of an actor for the consequences of his conduct. To do
this, courts appeal to normative notions of responsibility, often related to
foreseeability or risk creation. ' As the leading torts treatise recounts,
proximate cause generally refers to "the limitation which the courts have placed
upon the actor's responsibility for the consequences of the actor's conduct."" 6
The problem in the occurrence context arises when courts find one cause
when numerous entities merit assignment of responsibility. Contributing or
concurrent causes, in other words, confound the causation analysis in
occurrence determinations. The courts' rulings in these types of cases often
replace the proximate cause inquiry with a but-for causation inquiry: courts
look to a necessary condition of the injuries-a discrimination policy or a
decision to go into business- and call it the proximate cause despite the causal
iii. KEETON ET AL., supra note 57, § 42, at 273.
112. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 26 cmt. b (treating the two terms as identical).
113. WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 41, at 236 (4 th ed. 1971) ("The
fatal trespass done by Eve was cause of all our woe.").
114. Two types of reasons are common: corrective justice rationales limit liability to that which
the defendant is morally responsible, see KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, THE FORMS AND FUNCTIONS
OF TORT LAw 14-15 (3 d ed. 2007); DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 9 (2000), while
efficiency rationales limit liability to deter future behavior over which the defendant has
control, see ABRAHAM, supra, at 16; DOBBS, supra, § 11.
115. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 29 cmt. e (contrasting foreseeability and risk-creation
tests).
116. KEETON ET AL., supra note 57, § 41, at 264 (emphasis added).
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contribution of numerous other happenings."17 By so reasoning, however,
courts often undermine the very assessment of responsibility that has come to
define the proximate cause concept because their choices are at worst flawed
and at best unprincipled. The resulting reductionist oversimplification of
causation undermines the theory underlying the turn to proximate cause in the
first place. Without its connotation of responsibility, the proximate cause
concept loses it normative appeal as a way of organizing legal relationships."8
The confusion resulting from their errors, furthermore, adds to the
inconsistency of proximate cause analysis.
For example, in numerous discrimination cases courts have found one
cause: the employer's company policy. '1 9 But it is inappropriate to absolve of
responsibility the implementers of a discriminatory policy. Discrimination does
not occur at the snap of an executive's fingers. Rather, the implementers also
discriminate and are responsible for their actions. This view underlies
whistleblower law, the protections of which assume that individuals lower on
the corporate food chain have some control over their actions and should be
protected for refusing to violate the law. To be sure, respondeat superior
principles suggest holding high-level officers responsible for their decisions.
But respondeat superior only extends blame to the higher officials- it does not
absolve the lower officials. At the very least, in these situations there are
contributing causes of the discrimination and responsibility should be shared
between the policymaker and the implementer. Finding one cause prevents this
sharing of responsibility and therefore disconnects proximate cause from
responsibility because the choice between executive and implementer is
unprincipled. 2'
Asbestos case law provides an even more extreme example of stretching
proximate cause beyond meaningfulness. The court in Greene, Tweed & Co. v.
Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., for example, held that all of a manufacturer's
products -involving "6o,ooo underlying asbestos claimants who were exposed
117. As noted above, outcome-based judging likely motivates some of these decisions. Confusion
over the complicated concept of proximate cause may explain other results, as this section
indicates.
liS. Holmes v. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 268 (1992) ("At bottom, the notion of
proximate cause reflects 'ideas of what justice demands, or of what is administratively
possible and convenient."') (quoting KEETON ET AL., supra note 57, § 41, at 264).
iig. E.g., Appalachian Ins. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 676 F.2d 56 (3d Cir. 1982) (sex
discrimination); Transp. Ins. Co. v. Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 1325 (N.D.
Tex. 198o) (race discrimination).
120. Part of this problem stems from the inapplicability of responsibility-sharing mechanisms,
such as comparative negligence, to this context. An either-or or absolute framework requires
a consolidation of responsibility that reality does not bear.
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to ioS different asbestos products used in very different industrial applications
in at least eighteen states during different periods of time"'21 - constituted one
occurrence.'22 Yet, the creation of the asbestos-using business was not a
sufficient cause of all the different injuries, but only a necessary cause. The
creation of the business did not necessarily lead to the production of particular
products, nor to the distribution to particular claimants. To see the problem
with calling the creation of the business the proximate cause, consider the case
of a retired businessman who builds a business and then turns it over to his
heirs. The new management then begins manufacturing new products. It
would strain credulity to place liability for product defects of these new
products on the retired businessman. But this result is exactly what the
proximate cause assessment in Greene demands. In this case, there is no doubt
that proximate cause has been stretched beyond recognition. At the very least,
there are certainly intervening causes for each product.
Second, in other cases, courts find multiple causes in a way that conflicts
with the reality of human decisionmaking. This point is both biological and
philosophical. For example, the court in Koikos ruled that two nearly
simultaneous shots from the same gun in the hands of the same shooter
constituted two separate causes and thus two occurrences. 123 It is strange,
however, to speak of these different shots as if they are separate causes because
it is inaccurate from a real world perspective to describe near-simultaneous
gunshots as the product of multiple decisions within the mind. As the dissent
in Koikos persuasively argued,
If this gunman had used an automatic weapon and merely kept
squeezing the trigger, injuring loo people, it would be plain that there
was but one occurrence because the liability of the insured covered by
the policy would arise from the insured's singular failure to prevent
the gunman from shooting his weapon. If, rather than negligently
providing security against a gunman, the restaurant had negligently
entrusted its vehicle to a person who intentionally drove the vehicle
121. Civil Action No. 03-3637, 2006 WL 1050110, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 21, 2006) (quoting
Plaintiffs Response to Second Notice of Supplemental Authorization, Greene, 2005 WIL
4341823, at *5).
122. Consistent with other asbestos cases above, the ruling in this case is pro-insurer and
anti-manufacturer.
123. Koikos v. Travelers Ins. Co., 849 So. 2d 263, 265 (Fla. 2003); see also Am. Indem. Co. v.
McQuaig, 435 So. 2d 414, 415 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (finding that three shotgun blasts by
the same individual within three minutes constituted separate occurrences).
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into the restaurant, injuring two people, plainly there would be but
one occurrence.'
4
Neurobiological research on reaction times confirms the dissent's skepticism
that the human mind can consciously decide to activate the nerves to pull the
trigger two times nearly simultaneously is well founded. "Simple" reaction
time - one stimulus and one response- averages 220 milliseconds, while more
complex reaction times-to recognize a stimulus or to choose a correct
response to a stimulus -require much more time, nearly half a second. '25 At
best, this evidence suggests that "near-simultaneous" gunshots involved a
"choice" in less than half a second's time, hardly a solid foundation on which to
distinguish two instances of responsibility. Philosophically, it is difficult to
consider the decision to shoot once into a group of people as entirely separate
as a cause from the decision to shoot again: both involve the same preliminary,
and perhaps more significant, decision to shoot at all. The automatic weapon
hypothetical is instructive as to the ethics of responsibility here: holding down
the trigger would not be divided into separate decisions. In other words, a
questionable distinction between acts and omissions appears to be at work in
the Koikos court's reasoning.126 Biology and philosophy, in short, suggest that
in Koikos, there was one cause: a man decided to shoot a gun at people. This
result, however, would have lowered the recovery of the insured, and thus the
victim, to five hundred thousand dollars instead of one million dollars because
of a per-occurrence limit."27 The court's ruling of two occurrences was a pro-
insured result.
124. Koikos, 849 So. 2d at 274 (Wells, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
125. D.R.J. LAMING, INFORMATION THEORY OF CHOICE-REACTION TIMES 62 tbl. 5.4 .3 (1968)
(reporting a 220 millisecond reaction time for a simple reaction and a 384 millisecond
reaction time for a recognition reaction). Numerous studies confirm that more complex
reactions require more time, e.g., R. DUNCAN LUCE, RESPONSE TIMES: THEIR ROLE IN
INFERRING ELEMENTARY MENTAL ORGANIZATION 208 (1986); J.M.T. Brebner & A.T.
Welford, Introduction: An Historical Background Sketch, in REACTION TIMES 1-23 (A.T.
Welford ed., 198o); William H. Teichner & Marjorie J. Krebs, Laws of Visual Choice Reaction
Time, 81 PSYCHOL. REv. 75 (1974), including the landmark study of F.C. Donders, On the
Speed of Mental Processes, 30 ACTA PSYCHOLOGICA 412 (W.G. Koster trans., 1969) (1869). It
should be noted that the motor aspect of the reaction is consistent across the types of
reactions, so that the mental processing is the only variable. Jeff 0. Miller, & Kathy Low,
Motor Processes in Simple, Go/No-Go, and Choice Reaction Time Tasks: A Psychophysiological
Analysis, 27 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: HUM. PERCEPTION & PERFORMANCE 266 (2001).
126. Numerous theorists have criticized the act/omission distinction for a variety of reasons. E.g.,
Luke Gormally, Against Voluntary Euthanasia, in PRINCIPLES OF HEALTH CARE ETHICS 763,
764 (Raanan Gillon ed., 1994).
127. Koikos, 849 So. 2d at 265.
i5o8
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Similarly, at times courts find what appears to be one act, but with multiple
consequences, to be two causes. For example, in State Farm Fire & Casualty,
discussed above, the court decided that negligence in supervising an adult who
abused multiple children constituted separate causes.2s It seems more accurate
to say, however, that one mistake- negligent supervision -with multiple
effects occurred. In fact, this is exactly what the court decided when it came to
the abuse of each child, as the discussion above noted.'29 The court correctly
ruled in that part of the case that not realizing and continuing to perpetuate a
mistake is not necessarily another mistake under a negligence standard.
IV.AN INDEPENDENCE APPROACH
The previous Part argued that current doctrine is inconsistent. The choice
between the variations of the causation approach is standardless. The
application of the particular variations is unprincipled, and perhaps even
outcome based. And the variations are at times internally incoherent. An
independence test, in which the court determines the number of occurrences by
looking to whether the injuries are independent of each other, thus has the
opportunity to provide, and in fact does provide, two obvious advantages.
First, it allows for more consistency than the fuzzy causation inquiry because of
its statistical, not metaphysical, basis. 3° Second, it reduces the opportunity for
outcome-based judging.
More importantly, an independence approach better comports with the
intent of the parties. That insurable events are independent of each other is a
fundamental assumption of the operation of insurance. It is therefore
reasonable to presume that in most cases the parties contract for insurance with
this background principle in mind. 3' Interpreters of the contract should use, as
a default rule, this independence principle to determine the scope of coverage.
This Part first briefly discusses the independence assumption of insurance.
It next describes how an independence test functions in practice. Then, the
128. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Elizabeth N., 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d 327 (Ct. App. 1992).
129. See supra text accompanying notes 104-1o6.
13o. There is also only one variation, unlike the two variations of the causation approach.
131. To be sure, unsophisticated insured parties may not have this principle in mind to the same
extent as sophisticated insurers and insured parties. That is not to say that they have another
principle, such as the causation approach, in mind. Rather, unsophisticated insured parties
likely lack any specific intention, especially given the standardization of insurance forms and
the market power of insurance companies. Obviously, this phenomenon is a problem, but it
is a general one in insurance that has little bearing on this Note, as it equally affects any
method of interpretation of insurance contracts.
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Part advances three reasons supporting an independence approach. Finally, it
addresses counterarguments to the independence proposal.
A. The Independence Model in Practice
Because insurance systems rely on the law of large numbers, insurers
assume that the events for which they pay out - occurrences - are independent.
This assumption allows insurance companies to predict payouts because of
knowledge and estimates of accident - occurrence - rates and of average losses
per occurrence.1 32 When occurrences are not independent, however, insurance
companies cannot rely on the law of large numbers, and thus cannot accurately
predict their expected payout, because they cannot predict the average number
of occurrences.'33 In other words, nonindependence undermines the insurance
system.
3 4
An inquiry into the statistical independence of two events requires courts to
make a different type of finding than that made in typical causation analysis.
This Section discusses the functioning of this new test in practice. It first
details the types of probabilities required for the independence determination,
discusses the decisions to be made regarding these probabilities, and details the
sources of such data. The following Section provides a further account of the
reasons an independence approach is superior to a causation approach.
1. The Probabilities in an Independence Test
The determination that two events are independent requires the application
of basic statistical analysis to empirically based probabilities. Formally, two
events A and B are independent if and only if P(A r- B) = P(A)P(B)."3' In other
words, the probability that both A and B occur (called the probability of the
intersection of A and B, denoted P(A r B)) must be the same as the product of
the probability of A and the probability of B. The determination of
independence, therefore, requires three probabilities: the probability that both
events occur, the probability that A occurs, and the probability that B occurs.3 6
132. See BAKER, supra note 20, at 3.
133. Of course, uncertainty in the causation approach compounds this problem.
134. This Note is indebted to George Priest for first working with me on this approach in a
course on insurance law at the Yale Law School.
135. MOORE & MCCABE, supra note 38, at 295.
136. This formula readily generalizes to the case of more than two events. See id.
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Abstract statistics translate easily to the insurance context. P(A) and P(B)
are the probabilities of loss, such as the.destruction of a building or the abuse
of a child. Furthermore, in insurance, P(A) and P(B) are identical because the
important inquiry is whether similar losses are independent, such as the loss of
two nearby buildings, as in World Trade Center Properties, 3 7 or the abuse of two
children, as in Elizabeth N."38 Consequently, P(A)P(B) is in actuality P(A)P(A)
because A is similar to B, such that the probability of each is the same by
definition. The intersection of A and B is the probability that both losses occur,
such as the probability of the destruction of two buildings or the abuse of two
children.
2. Defining the Loss
At this point, it is important to clarify that events A and B, the events for
which insurance is purchased and sold, must be defined in order to ascertain
their probabilities. In this determination, courts should concentrate on the
intent of the contracting parties because insurance contract interpretation, like
contract interpretation generally, is about the bargain struck by the parties. In
insurance, furthermore, the intent of the parties is crucial because of the
probabilistic calculations parties make when contracting for insurance. The
entire system, in this sense, relies on implementation of the expectations of the
parties. It is this same focus on intent that motivates the turn to independence
as a background presumption embedded in the occurrence concept. Intent,
therefore, properly underlies the definition of the loss as well. Evidence of
intent may be actual or presumed. Actual intent may be derived from explicit
provision or bargained rates. Presumed intent can be derived from industry
standards, common sense, or other areas of law.
The determination of intent is first and foremost a matter of contract.
39
For example, in the case of incidents of negligent supervision of an adult who
abuses multiple children,' 40 the events for which insurance was purchased are
determined by the insurance contract. It is possible that the insured purchased
insurance for child abuse -a school might be likely to do so. It is also possible
that the insured purchased insurance for negligent supervision resulting in
injury- a large corporation is unlikely to purchase child abuse insurance. If the
latter, the relevant loss is negligent supervision causing injury, and the court
137. World Trade Ctr. Props., L.L.C. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 34 5 F.3d 154 (2d Cir. 2003).
138. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Elizabeth N., 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d 3 27 (Ct. App. 1992).
139. See supra Part I.
140. See, e.g., Elizabeth N., 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d 327.
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must determine the probability of such negligence. 141 If the former, the event is
child abuse and the court must determine the probability of such abuse.
Clearly, the probabilities for negligent supervision resulting in injury and child
abuse may differ. The touchstone is the intent of the parties.
In some cases, the contract will not be explicit about the loss but actual
intent can be clearly derived from the bargained rates. The way in which
premiums were calculated and the decisions to seek insurance were made
provide significant evidence of intent. If the premium of a widget
manufacturer, for example, reflects the going rate for products liability
insurance for widgets, losses should be defined with respect to liability for
widgets -that is, damage from a product constitutes a loss. If, on the other
hand, the rate reflects the industry rate for regulatory compliance issues, then
loss may be defined by problems in the plant, such as a lights-out energy
saving policy. 142 Of course, premiums often include many rates, but these can
be disaggregated in the same way that riders for specific coverage can be added
to standard form policies and specific coverage can be negotiated for and
purchased on its own.
Even without this direct evidence, in some cases industry practice indicates
why insurance was purchased. Though a product manufacturer may buy a
CGL policy, the industry practice indicates that this policy is intended to cover
losses from products liability and that the premiums reflect such
understandings. It would contravene common business practice to define
losses in a way other than the principle of one individual product-related
injury, one loss, such as the principle of one division of a company, one loss.
Businesses do not purchase products liability insurance to cover losses
organized by the internal structure of their organizations but rather losses
organized by the injuries themselves. If multiple injuries count as one loss,
businesses have been severely underinsuring. Other contracts contain similar
evidence for the presumption of intent in defining the loss: in property
insurance, for example, the loss of a building to fire is necessarily perceived as
the loss of the entire building, not individual floors. In the gunshot context, the
shooting of two individuals is reasonably defined as two losses because two
individuals are present and shot separately. In short, common sense reasoning,
especially regarding separation of time and space of losses, provides a
141. The best way to do so is probably through insurer payouts, as recorded by industry groups,
but other methods are also available. See infra Subsection IV.A.3 (discussing sources of
data).
142. The CGL policy is a combination of numerous risks. The task would be to look at the
breakdown for particular risks -the marginal increase in the premium for the addition or
subtraction of coverage for a particular type of loss.
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reasonable way to presume intent in the loss definition context - an inquiry
necessary to make insurance contract interpretation under an independence
approach fully based on the intent of the parties.
Other areas of law often support these intent determinations. Respect for
the individual, for example, makes it seem contrary to the intent of the parties
to view the death of numerous individuals as one loss. 1 43 The importance
attached to property ownership may provide similar intentions for insured
parties that suffer losses on multiple properties, such as in the WTC case. For
example, if for some reason multiple properties are not clearly separated in the
insurance contract, American law's emphasis on property indicates that
individuals have separate interests in each property, not one collective interest
as a property holder in the abstract. The point is that other areas of law
evidence common sense perceptions that assist in the determination of intent
in defining losses by providing evidence of the relationship of values to
insurable interests.
As this inquiry becomes further removed from the explicit contractual
definition of loss, the independence approach arguably increasingly resembles
143. It is arguably a background principle of the American constitutional framework- a principle
transportable as a background presumption of insurance contracting- that individuals
should be treated equally because of the value of individuals, not the value of equality in
itself. A similar point can be drawn from the outcry over unequal payouts, depending on
earnings, from the World Trade Center Victim Compensation Fund (VCF). See LLOYD
DIXON & RACHEL KAGANOOF STERN, COMPENSATION FOR LOSSES FROM THE 9/11 ATrACKS, at
xxiv (2004) ("First, tailoring payments to expected lifetime earnings meant that some
families received considerably more than others. Those who received less wondered why the
lives of their loved ones were less valued than those of others who made more money. It is
not clear, however, that a more equal distribution of payments would have resulted in any
less divisiveness among beneficiaries, given the complaints about the VCF from families of
the highest wage earners."); Christopher Lee, Report on Sept. ii Fund Is Released: Program a
Success, but Equal Payouts to Victims Would Have Been Better, Master Says, WASH. POST, Nov.
18, 2004, at A3 ("The federal compensation for victims of the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks
could have been distributed more fairly and efficiently if equal payouts had been given to all
families instead of basing awards on factors such as the victim's age and potential lost
income, according to the fund's administrator."); Kelly Patricia O'Meara, September 11 Fund
Gets Jeers, Not Cheers: Critics of the Federal Victim Compensation Fund Say Its Rules on How
Victims' Families Will Be Compensated for Pain, Suffering and Lost Wages Are Discriminatory,
INSIGHT, Feb. 18, 2002, at 19, i9 ("[Oklahoma Republican Governor Frank] Keating
empathizes with the survivors, but questions the fairness of the formula. 'For taxpayers to
have their money distributed on the basis of education, social status and income,' he
exclaims, 'is fundamentally inequitable and un-American. This legislation sets a precedent
by effectively saying that the person who washed dishes at the World Trade Center isn't
worth as much as the person whose dishes were being washed -that the dishwasher's life is
worth less because of his career choice.'").
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the causation approach, so that the independence model is no advance.' 44 But
this transformation is neither likely nor complete for several reasons. First,, in
many cases actual intent will exist or presumed intent will be readily deducible.
This focusing and cabining of judicial discretion is itself an advancement over a
largely standardless and manipulable proximate causation inquiry.45 Second,
even when intent evidence is lacking, the turn to industry standards and
practice produce a more objective method than the metaphysical causation
inquiry, which is moral and normative, not descriptive. 146 Finally, in the event
that both of these objective measures fail, analysis through common sense and
other areas of law, while mimicking the causation approach in some ways, is
still tethered to intent. Common sense judgments tethered to intent, in turn,
are more constrained and more related to the parties' expectation than
causation metaphysics, which is necessarily untethered. This foundation limits
the plausible range of outcomes, and this increased certainty is an advantage. 47
The standard, in short, is not whether the independence approach is perfectly
objective at all times -it is not always objective because intent is not always
ascertainable. Rather, the question is whether the independence approach is an
advance over the causation approach. On that metric, it passes. 148
A related way of putting the problem is that in some areas of insurance,
probabilities of events may be calculated at different levels of specificity. The
probability of an event, in other words, depends on the characterization of the
event, not just the counting of how many such events occurred. Commentators
have noticed an analogous problem in the causation approach, in which
determining the number of causes depends "on the position in which the
person who has to make the determination is placed." '49 To continue with the
child abuse example, assuming the party contracted for child abuse insurance,
and not negligent supervision, it may be the case that different probabilities
144. I would like to thank Kenneth Abraham for raising this point.
145. Nor is this response comparing the ideal to the real.
146. The shift from "is" to "ought" is not problematic because intent, through which practice is
presumed, bridges the gap.
147. The reliance factor in stare decisis illustrates the value of certainty in the law. See Planned
Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854 (1992) (O'Connor, J.) (arguing that in
deciding whether to overturn precedent courts should look to "whether the rule is subject to
a kind of reliance that would lend a special hardship to the consequences of overruling and
add inequity to the cost of repudiation"); id. at 996-97 (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part).
148. See supra Section IV.B (discussing reasons for the independence approach and providing a
cost-benefit analysis).
149. Derrington, supra note 18, at 841-42 (quoting Kuwait Airway Corp. v. Kuwait Ins. Co.,
(1996) 1 Lloyd's Rep. 664 (Q.B)).
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apply depending on what degree of detail is used to describe an event and an
insured party. Child abuse may be characterized, for example, as child abuse in
an elementary school setting (most specific), child abuse in a school setting
(intermediate), and child abuse in a setting where children and adults readily
interact (most general). In other words, the probability of child abuse is
affected by the setting category.
Courts faced with this similar formulation of the problem should focus on
the same progression as this Section indicates: (1) actual intent through (a) an
explicit provision, or (b) bargained rates; and (2) presumed intent through (a)
industry standards, (b) common sense, or (c) other areas of law. The focus,
above all, should be on the intent of the parties, as it is this intent that serves as
the basis for the calculation of the probabilities underlying insurance rates and
contracts. It is also this focus on intent that justifies the presumption of
independence in the occurrence concept. While this need to focus on intent is
clear in the abstract, the factual intensity of particular accident narrative can
both obscure it theoretically and complicate it emotionally for the adjudicator.
Adjudicators, as many commentators point out, often decide cases without the
time to reflect on first principles and with grieving parties immediately before
them."s  Yet, this determination is critically important because the
characterization of an event may affect the probability used by the court in the
independence calculation if different characterizations result in varying
probabilities.
3. Sources ofData
As the above formula and discussion suggests, the calculation of
independence flows easily once the statistics are obtained. The probabilities can
be readily calculated from historical and scientific data already compiled and
used by insured parties, insurance companies, industry groups, scholarly
researchers, and policymakers."'5 The fact that accidents are noteworthy and,
consequently, that numerous individuals count them guarantees ready and
available sources of data.
15o. See sources cited supra note 1o9.
151. See CONTRIBUTIONS TO INSURANCE ECONOMICS (Georges Dionne ed., 1992); DAVID A.
LEREAH, INSURANCE MARKETS: INFORMATION PROBLEMS AND REGULATION (1985); Michelle
F. Boardman, Known Unknowns: The Illusion of Terrorism Insurance, 93 GEo. L.J. 783, 815
(2005) ("Insurance risks are calculated using scientific or historical data.").
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First of all, the two probabilities of the events occurring by themselves,
P(A) and P(B),1s2 are the very probabilities on which insurance companies and
insured parties ground their risk assessments and premium calculations."5 3 In
order to sell insurance for products liability, for example, insurance companies
assess the rate of product defects. Insurance companies calculate the premium
they need to charge by multiplying the predicted size of a payout by the
incidence of payouts to determine an expected payout, to which they add a
profit term. The incidence of payouts is a function of the number of
accidents.5 4 This rate is tabulated from historical data.
Data is available from numerous sources in the industry.' Insurers collect
their own data so as to price their products. Insured parties, particularly
sophisticated parties, make similar calculations when deciding to pay particular
premiums, to shop for other premiums, or to self-insure." 6 Insurance data is
also pooled by numerous organizations that exist because of state reporting
requirements. Insurance regulators exercise oversight over rates, and need
152. Often, it bears repeating, only one probability will be needed because the two events in
question will be substantially similar, such as multiple gunshots or multiple instances of
products liability. In these cases, an important question will be deciding whether the events
are in fact similar. The factors discussed above regarding defining events should guide this
decision.
153. See generally M.E. ATKINSON & D.C.M. DICKSON, AN INTRODUCTION TO ACTUARIAL STUDIES
(2000) (describing the formulation of risk assessments).
154. Of course, the payout rate is not necessarily the same as the accident rate due to transaction
costs and human error in the insurance system: the rate includes an error term for improper
payouts due to litigation error, insurance fraud, and insurance company error. These three
errors are themselves subject to calculation and, therefore, an accident rate can be
determined. See Harrington & Danzon, supra note 107, at 291.
5s. Insurers may be required to produce such data in discovery for trial, although that inquiry is
beyond the scope of this Note. It is unlikely such procedures will bias the data given both
the necessity of accurate data for insurance companies to operate and, even in the face of
dishonesty, the presence of both numerous insurance companies with competing datasets
and trade associations compiling data.
156. The most prominent example, perhaps, is the decision of asbestos manufacturers to
self-insure. See, e.g., Keene Corp. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d io34 (D.C. Cir. 1981)
(involving a self-insured asbestos manufacturer). Many doctors have also recently made this
decision. See Damon Adams, Doctor's Self-Insurance Found To Meet Standard, AM. MED.
NEWS, July 25, 2005, http://www.ama-assn.org/amednews/2oo5/o7/25/prsbo725.htm
(chronicling a West Virginia doctor winning the right to self-insure in court); David B.
Mandell & Jason M. O'Dell, Pay Up, Self Insure, Go Bare, or Quit Medicine, PHYSICIAN'S
NEws DIG., Aug. 2008, http://www.physiciansnews.com/business/8o8mandell.html
(noting that hundreds of medical groups have begun self-insuring).
157. See, e.g., Insurance Services Office, Helping Insurers Price Their Products,
http://www.iso.com/About-ISOiSO-Services-for-Property-Casualty-Insurance/Helping-
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data on premiums and losses to do so., s8 The ISO, for example, gathers
information from insurers on hundreds of millions of policies regarding
premiums and losses. It then uses that information to create products and
services that assist insurers in pricing their products. ' 9
This last point regarding regulation confirms that the insurance industry is
not the only source of this data. Nonparties to the insurance contract also have
such data in a wide variety of cases. For products liability, for example,
consumer groups constantly evaluate products and services,'6 government
product safety commissions analyze safety in the licensing process,'6 attorneys
general catalogue complaints about manufacturers and retailers, 62 and
scientific researchers study complicated products as part of basic and applied
research. 6, Policymakers also routinely estimate the number of accidents when
assessing the effect of legal reforms.
64
This type of data has made its way into the courts, most commonly in
insurance fraud cases. In United States v. Veysey, for example, the Seventh
Circuit considered evidence regarding the probability of fire in residential
Insurers-Price-Their-Products.html (last visited May 4, 2009) ("We submit summaries of
that information to insurance regulators-as required by law-to help the regulators
evaluate the price of insurance in each state.").
SS. For a useful overview of insurance regulation, see generally National Association of
Insurance Commissioners, http://www.naic.org/index-about.htm (last visited May 4,
2009).
159. See, e.g., Insurance Services Office, supra note 157; Independent Statistical Service, Inc.,
http://www.iss-statistical.net (last visited May 4, 2009) ("The Independent Statistical
Service Inc. (ISS) serves more than 450 companies reporting in excess of $115 billion in
annual written premium.").
16o. The most prominent example is Ralph Nader's watchdog group, U.S. Public Interest
Research Group. See, e.g., Liz HITCHCOCK & EDMUND MIERZWINSKI, TROUBLE IN TOYLAND:
THE 23RD ANNUAL SURVEY OF Toy SAFETY (2008) (collecting data on toy safety), available at
http://www.uspirg.org/uploads/UK/NE/UKNEruiSS4LqBkfsij8gAA2oo8ToylandReport.
pdf.
161. The federal government's Consumer Product Safety Commission is one example, although
states have their own such agencies.
162. Most offices of state attorneys general focus on consumer complaints. See, e.g., Maryland
Attorney General, Consumer Protection, http://www.oag.state.md.us/Consumer/index.htm
(last visited May 4, 2009).
163. FDA-related research is perhaps the most prominent example.
164. Both legislatures and agencies are active in assessing accident rates. For example, in
studying speed limits, automobile accidents are surveyed. E.g., NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC
SAFETY ADMIN. NAT'L CTR. FOR STATISTICS & ANALYSIS, TRAFFIC SAFETY FACTS: 2007 DATA,
http://www.nhtsa.dot.gov/portaVnhtsa-static-file-downloader.jsp?file=/staticfiles/DOT/N
HTSA/NCSA/Content/TSF/2oo7/81o993.pdf (last visited May 4, 2009).
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homes.'6 s Veysey was convicted of mail and wire fraud for setting fire to four
residences and inflating the insurance claims thereon. To prove the insurance
fraud, the government relied on the testimony of an actuary. The actuary first
calculated the probability of residential fires, and then calculated the
probability of four residential fires occurring by chance, one in 1.773 trillion,
assuming independence. 66 While Judge Posner took the lawyers for Veysey to
task for not criticizing the independence assumption and chosen reference class
of the actuary, 6 7 the court affirmed the conviction. The case demonstrates both
that data relevant to the independence calculation exists and that courts can
grapple with issues related to statistical calculations, including defining the
loss, a reference class problem. 168
The probability of the intersection of A and B is similarly accessible. In
order to ensure sufficient capital reserves, insurers must estimate the amount of
injury associated with particular accidents. 6' This prediction is based on the
type of injury that may occur17' And a major determinant of the type of injury
is whether A and B, just A, just B, or none of the three occurs. Government
agencies, policymakers and other researchers, of course, may make similar
estimates for this probability just as they do for the probability of individual
events, in the course of their decisions regarding regulatory requirements. In
fact, insurance companies routinely perform it themselves in the ordinary
course of business when deciding what types of risks to insure: scholars often
point out that the rationale for the war exclusion, environmental exclusions,
and the dearth of terrorism insurance stems from insurer's calculation of the
dependence of these risks. 7 ' This type of calculation is also relevant for
insurance fraud investigations, an increasing concern of insurers. r2 As Veysey
165. 334 F.3 d 6oo (7 th Cir. 2003).
166. Id. at 603.
167. Id. at 603-04. 1
168. Experience with DNA evidence and its reliability evidences similar judicial analysis of
statistics. See cases cited infra note 224 (deciding whether to admit DNA evidence based on
its statistical reliability).
169. See BAKER, supra note 20, at 2-3.
170. See Boardman, supra note 151, at 812 (describing how an insurer calculates the necessary
reserve by estimating total losses).
171. See, e.g., id.; Sean B. Hecht, Climate Change and the Transformation of Risk: Insurance Matters,
55 UCLAL. REV. 1559 (2008).
172. See Bruce R. Fox, Technology: The New Weapon in the War on Insurance Fraud, 67 DEF.
COUNSEL J. 237 (2000); ISO, Claims Information and Tools To Fight Fraud,
http://www.iso.com/About-ISO/ISO-Services-for-Property-Casualty-Insurance/Claims-
Information-and-Tools-to-Fight-Fraud.html (last visited May 4, 2009).
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indicates, it is useful to know the probability of multiple losses when detecting
and prosecuting insurance fraud, in that case the likelihood that multiple
residential fires.might occur.
4. Legal Independence
The independence test presumes both that relevant data is available and
that insurers only insure purely independent events. The foregoing Subsection
has intimated some potential problems with the former presumption -data is
often but not always of the exact type needed for independence analysis.
Similarly, there is also some reason to think-based on the existence of
specialized insurance for dependent risks like natural disasters-that insurers
do not always require perfect independence, either as a result of the above
mentioned data imperfections or because near-independence presents such a
small risk of devastating loss that it is not problematic from a business
standpoint. A concept of legal independence as a standard lower than perfect
independence, therefore, may be useful. While a legal independence
contractual standard still requires an inquiry into independence, it does not
require complete lack of correlation of losses.
A standard of legal independence can come from two sources: regulators or
parties. Regulators - state legislatures and, more likely, insurance
commissioners -may want to set a certain level of independence as a
requirement in order to assure the viability of the insurance system. Just as
insurance regulators establish requirements and conduct oversight over
reserves and practices, so they may also want to assure that insurance
companies do not become insolvent - harming victims who vote - due to the
insuring of dependent risks. The plausibility of the failure of large insurance
companies is particularly salient since the bailout of AIG, which also highlights
the potential ramifications of the failure of insurance companies for the public
fisc. The creation of the World Trade Center Victim Compensation Fund
provides one example of regulators' awareness and action in the face of such
insurer solvency concerns. 173 Regulation by government, however, would likely
be minimal in the form of floors for independence, like other floors set by
regulators, such as reserve requirements, and thus not particularly
interventionist.
173. See DIXON & STERN, supra note 143.
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Second, and more likely to occur, the parties themselves may contract for
insurance of certain kinds of dependent risks. 174 The insured parties may be
willing to pay a premium to protect against natural disasters or other
dependent risks and insurers may be willing to take on dependent risks as an
aggressive investment in the risky portion of their insurance portfolios. To
some extent, this practice already occurs: flood insurance is available for a
price. 175
An independence approach to determining the number of occurrences
should not preclude the contractual freedom to conduct these types of
transactions. Courts reviewing such arrangements should respect the parties'
choice for the same reason an independence approach is valuable: consistency
with parties' intent. It should be noted that not all legal independence
arrangements will be explicit, especially for those already in existence. Thus, to
ascertain expectations as best as possible, courts should progress through the
actual and presumed intent steps in the previous Subsection regarding defining
the loss.
Permitting a legal independence concept, consequently, has two advantages
over requiring strict independence. First, as alluded to above, flexibility is
consistent with the intent-based rationale of the independence approach. If the
parties intend to contract for insurance for dependent losses, so the argument
extends, they should be free to do so for the same reason that the baseline
presumption of their intention for independence should carry weight. Second,
the concept also has the advantage of "grandfathering in" insurance policies
contracted before a change to an independence approach. Interpretive methods
affect drafters of private law as well as public law,176 so a change to
independence is likely to affect the way insurance contracts are written, but
only in the future. A legal independence approach bridges this gap, and allows
current practices of insuring dependent risks to continue.
174. This flexibility is consistent with the flexibility with in the independence approach to
contract for particular ways of defining losses. See supra Subsection IV.A.2.
175. The price in the market, although high, is also deflated by government subsidies,
highlighting the problems of insuring dependent risk. The Budgetary Treatment of Subsidies
in the National Flood Insurance Program Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban
Affairs (20o6) (statement of Donald B. Matron, Acting Director); JAYETrA Z. HECKER, DIR.
PHYSICAL INFRASTRUCTURE, FLOOD INSURANCE: CHALLENGES FACING THE NATIONAL FLOOD
INSURANCE PROGRAM (2003), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/do36o6t.pdf
(submitted as testimony to the House Subcommittee on Housing and Community
Opportunity of the Committee on Financial Services).
176. One side in the debate over legislative history presumes as much.
1520
118:1484 2009
THE LAW OF DESCRIBING ACCIDENTS
B. Advantages of an Independence Approach
The independence approach is not flawless. As the discussion in the
previous Section indicated, loss definition problems, data availability issues,
and legal independence practices may complicate the theoretical simplicity of
the model. Despite these potential issues, the independence approach is
superior to the causation approach for three reasons.
First, the independence approach is more likely to be consistent with the
intent of the parties.177 In contract law, the intent of the parties is the
touchstone for interpretation of ambiguous terms. 171 As the Second Restatement
of Contracts summarizes, "Where the parties have attached the same meaning to
a promise or agreement or a term thereof, it is interpreted in accordance with
that meaning. 1 79 Even more intent-focused, another section promises that "if




This principle is equally applicable to insurance contracts. As the Second
Circuit has remarked, "The cardinal principle for the construction and
interpretation of insurance contracts-as with all contracts-is that the
intentions of the parties should control. '',s Furthermore, there is significant
support for the view that insurance contracts should be interpreted according
to the "reasonable expectations" of the parties182
In insurance contracting, there are several reasons to believe that the parties
contract in the shadow of a background principle that losses are
independent. 83 First, the independence of losses is a fundamental assumption
of insurance systems. 84 Without it, insurers risk catastrophic, business-ending
losses. Consequently, it would be anomalous if insurers, knowing the effects of
177. Making the independence approach a default rule has the advantage of forcing those parties
who have idiosyncratic preferences, particularly the willingness to insure correlated risks or
pay higher premiums for insurance for correlated risks, to convey those preferences. In other
words, it is information forcing, and in the very cases currently most likely to be treated
poorly by the causation approach - those with dependent losses.
178. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACrS § 201-203 (1981).
179. Id. § 201.
18o. Id. § 202.
181. Newmont Mines Ltd. v. Hanover Ins. Co., 784 F.2d 127, 135 (2d Cir. 1986).
1S2. See Robert E. Keeton, Insurance Law Rights at Variance with Policy Provisions, 83 HARv. L.
REv. 961 (1970) (defining the reasonable expectations theory); Abidor, supra note 17, at 358-
59; Yin, supra note 17, at 1257.
183. To be sure, in insurance contracts with unsophisticated parties, intent is a legal fiction. The
law, however, generally relies on such a fiction to hold the contract valid at all.
184. See supra Part I.
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the dependence of losses, were to ignore them in their insurance contracting."8s
Second, empirical evidence demonstrates that insurers generally do not provide
insurance for dependent risks. The typical industry response to dependent
losses is not to provide insurance. Most prominently, the industry typically
does not cover losses from war or nuclear attack.186 It is also less likely for
insurers to insure all or even multiple gun manufacturers or chainsaw
manufacturers. 87 The causation approach, on the other hand, does not rest on
principles of insurance, so there is no reason to suspect parties contract with it
in mind, other than because of past judicial decisions.
Nonetheless, as the legal independence discussion indicates, the
independence approach should be a default rule, and not a mandatory rule,
because insurers sometimes provide insurance for correlated losses, but charge
a higher premium to do so. Flood insurance, for example, is available, though
private companies generally charge such high rates that they are crowded out
by government-subsidized or government-run insurers. 8" Similarly the
causation approach at times results in the insurance of correlated losses, but
insurers still provide insurance despite this legal doctrine. The child abuse and
medical malpractice examples discussed below are prime examples. The
185. The intent of the insured surely matters on this point. The willingness of insured parties to
pay high premiums for natural disaster insurance, for example, provides some evidence of
awareness of the phenomenon of dependent losses. Of course, as in most contracting
situations, more sophisticated parties are more likely to be aware of the theories underlying
economic phenomena.
186. See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., TERRORISM RISK INSURANCE IN OECD
COUNTRIES 117 (2005) (explaining why companies do not provide terrorism insurance);
Stempel, supra note 18, at 818 ("Nearly all of these [September ii] policies, like almost all
insurance policies, contain some type of war risk exclusion.").
187. I thank Kenneth Abraham for highlighting this example.
18s. I thank George Priest for pointing out this problem. See CATO HANDBOOK FOR CONGRESS
432 (2001), available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/handbook/hbio7 ("The subsidized rates
and limited underwriting and risk classification of federal government insurance programs
aggravate adverse selection, discourage efficient risk management, and crowd out market-
based alternatives."); U.S. TREASURY, REPORT TO CONGRESS: ASSESSMENT: THE TERRORISM
RISK INSURANCE ACT OF 2002, at 7 (2005); J. David Cummins, Should the Government Provide
Insurance for Catastrophes?, 2006 FED. RES. BANK ST. Louis REv. 337; Emil Henry, Jr.,
Assistant Sec'y for Fin. Insts., Remarks Before the National Association of Insurance
Commissioners Conference (Feb. 6, 20o6), available at
http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/js4o97.htm ("In June of last year, Treasury delivered
to Congress its report on the effectiveness of [Terrorism Risk Insurance Act] TRIA. We
concluded that TRIA had been effective in achieving its fundamental goal of enhancing the
availability and affordability of commercial property and casualty terrorism risk insurance,
including allowing time for rebuilding the capacity of the private sector, but was 'crowding
out' further private market development.").
118:1484 2009
THE LAW OF DESCRIBING ACCIDENTS
causation approach likely results,' 8, therefore, in higher premiums or
underprovision of insurance in those areas' 90 - an undesirable cost imposed by
the legal system that decreases the accessibility of insurance, which "governs
our lives."'' Regardless, the independence interpretive method should be a
default because insurance of dependent losses can still be more efficient than
noninsurance given high levels of risk aversion. The independence approach, in
other words, should be rebuttable because of the existence of situations in
which insurers provide insurance for correlated losses and. insured parties
compensate for this added risk with higher premiums.
The second advantage of the independence approach is that it is more
objective than the causation approach. The independence approach is
statistical, not metaphysical. Causation analysis, as the prior sections
demonstrated, is abstract. Courts make theoretical determinations regarding
degrees of connection - proximateness - between events and, inevitably, and in
fact are supposed to, rely on normative conceptions of responsibility.' 92 These
determinations are highly subjective. The incoherence, inconsistency, and
manipulability described in Part III provide evidence for this subjectivity.
Independence analysis, in contrast, relies on numbers, not abstract reasoning
as to causality. As many decision-making theorists have noted, it is harder to
manipulate and err in the calculation of statistics than in the assessment of
qualitative variables.'93 With the help of statistical analysis and the rebuttable
default that the parties do not intend to cover correlated losses, the inquiry is
clearly objective.
Even in the few cases where statistics do not exist, armchair independence
analysis is more objective than causation approaches because it is focused on
the intent of the parties. Without the help of statistics, this inquiry
undoubtedly becomes more abstract, and thus more akin to the metaphysical
189. To be sure, the uncertainty and inconsistency of the causation approach ironically may
-undermine this negative effect by accidentally, and wrongly from the point of view of a
causation approach, creating overlaps between the causation and independence approaches.
190. The anecdotal evidence regarding high premiums in child abuse insurance and medical
malpractice is well known. E.g., Michelle Tsai, Insurance for Sex Abuse, SLATE, July 16, 2007,
http://www.slate.com/id/217o482 ("Partly because of rising insurance costs, a small number
of churches are foregoing the coverage."); Press Release, Am. Coll. of Obstetricians &
Gynecologists, Women's Access to Health Care Hurt by Medical Liability Crisis (Nov. 3,
20o6), http ://www.acog.org/from home/publications/press-releases/nrl-o3-o6.cfm
(chronicling "increasing medical liability insurance premiums").
191. RIcHARD V. ERICSON, AARON DOYLE & DEAN BARRY, INSURANCE AS GOVERNANCE 3 (2003).
192. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 57.
193. See, e.g., MAx H. BAZERMAN, JUDGMENT IN MANAGERIAL DECISIONMAKING 199-202 (6th ed.
2006) (arguing for the use of linear models and statistical techniques to debias judgment).
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inquiry of the causation approach. Yet, the importance of intent creates a
crucial difference that objectifies the armchair independence inquiry; the
question is whether the parties contracted under the presumption that the
losses at issue were independent. 1 4 This is a different inquiry than a
"metaphysics of independence," and it is one that is more tied to the particular
parties, making it more objective and less subject to judicial discretion and
manipulation. It is an inquiry, for example, that can draw on industry
standards as a guiding force for any reasoning it must do to fill in the gaps of
silence. 9 For example, the industry practice of providing flood insurance with
higher premiums than the equivalent nonnatural disaster property insurance
provides evidence as to the parties' understanding of the dependence of losses
from floods.
A third advantage of the independence approach also makes it more
objective: independence analysis is ex ante, not ex post. The causation
approach considers the actual causes of losses and assesses their connection.
Courts necessarily are confronted with the details of the current fact pattern
before them. The independence approach, however, considers the statistical, or
potential, connection between losses. Courts need not consider the current fact
pattern, including the cause of the losses, at all. Rather, they need only
consider the connections contemplated by the statistics at the time of the
contracting."96 The inquiry is, in other words, generalized beyond the current
situation. In fact, a court could make a determination as to coverage before the
loss even accrued. In that sense, the inquiry is ex ante. 197 This difference places
the adjudicator at a slightly more removed step from the sympathetic or
unsympathetic victim in the case. Given the tendency in insurance to rule for
194. There is a tension in the independence approach between the question of whether the losses
are independent and whether the parties contracted as if they were independent. In most
case, the parties will be correct and the answer is the same. In others, as discussed in this
subsection, intent must govern because statistics are unavailable. In the few cases of conflict,
intent should ultimately govern just as it does when statistics are unavailable. See infra
Subsection IV.C.i.
195. The causation approach could be reformed to be intent-based, but even with that change it
still faces the problem that independence is a better assumption for the intent of the parties
because of its foundational role in insurance. Courts may or may not be more willing to start
over than to continue to attempt to revive a dying doctrine. Regardless, in this sense the
paper proposes two reforms: intent-based interpretation and an independence default as
substitutes for abstraction-based interpretation and a mandatory causation approach.
196. This method, of course, may create a problem for new phenomena. See infra Subsection
IV.C.1.
197. See supra note 195 (regarding intent-based reform of causation approach).
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the sympathetic party,' including through contra proferentem rules of
interpretation, ' 99 this distance is likely helpful. In other words, the abstract
nature of the inquiry ex ante eliminates the possibility of conscious or
unconscious prejudice to a particular party.
20 0
C. Problems with the Independence Approach
In addition to the counterarguments, nuances, and clarifications discussed
implicitly above, three counterarguments against this proposal deserve direct
discussion: first, that the independence approach does not accommodate the
possibility of unforeseen phenomena that create dependence among insured
losses; second, that the independence approach should be mandatory; and
third, that the effects on the court system due to reliance on empirical
calculations create dependence on experts and litigation inequalities.
1. Unforeseen Phenomena
An independence approach inquires as to whether losses are correlated.
New phenomena may create dependence, despite the fact that at the time of the
contract neither party thought the losses were dependent. The problem,
however, can arise under the causation approach, as new causes may surprise
the parties.2 0 1 And, this is a rare problem-even the terrorism of 9/11 was
arguably foreseeable given the World Trade Center attack in the mid-199os.
2 12
Regardless, there are a few options available to address it. First, the
independence approach could rely on independence determinations regarding
losses at the time of the contract. This option comports with intent, but lets
losses lie where they fall. Second, the burden could always be placed either on
the insurer or insured party, to provide an incentive for prediction by the more
expert party. The problem with this option is that insurers and insured parties
are often on different sides of the occurrence issue, and sometimes insurers are
198. See supra text accompanying notes 107-109.
199. See Harrington & Danzon, supra note 107, at 293 (discussing contra proferentem).
200. While the focus on intent arguably eliminates this concern, the effect is certainly greater in
an independence test than a causation test because the former is more economic and
objective, and less moral and manipulable, than the latter.
201. Insofar as parties act based on the causation approach, surprises under that approach are
just as jarring as under an independence approach.
202. See THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 72 (2004) (remarking that "the [1993 World Trade
Center] bombing signaled a new terrorist challenge").
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on both sides of a lawsuit-primary insurers sue secondary insurers and
reinsurers sue other insurers. °3 Third, equity suggests that an insurance
contract, like other contracts, should be rescinded on the grounds of mutual
mistake of a material fact, that losses thought to be independent by both
parties are in fact dependent.0 4 This option, too, leaves losses where they fall,
on the insured or victim, by eliminating the insurance payout. A combination
of the first and third options appears to be the best approach: rely on the intent
of the parties, but rescind the contract as applied to this particular loss if
extreme mutual mistake occurred. This approach has the advantage of
acknowledging the limitations on knowledge in a changing world,05 although
it leaves losses on the parties who suffer them. More importantly, this
approach best comports with an intentionalist view of contracts.
2. Opting Out: Contractual Independence
It could also be argued that the independence approach to interpreting the
number of occurrences should be a mandatory, and not just a default, rule.
Mandatory rules are employed to increase efficiency, create fairness, or rectify
other imperfections in contracts. But none of those rationales applies to a pure
independence approach. In particular, it can be efficient for an insurer and
insured party to determine a standard of contractual independence-a level of
correlation they are willing to tolerate in coverage in exchange for a higher
premium-if the risk aversion of the insured party is strong enough. 6
Dependent losses are not necessarily uninsurable, just more costly to insure.
Flood insurance, for example, is available, at a price. This contractual
independence could be specified by a statistical level of correlation as the legal
independence section discusses or even, if the parties so choose, by a
nonindependence-based measure, such as a causation approach. In other
words, if the parties are willing to sacrifice the advantages of an independence
approach- objectivity and the other points discussed above-it is not for the
court to overrule that choice absent public policy considerations, such as harms
203. This results from the fact that secondary insurers must cover losses the primary insurers
need not cover because of per-occurrence limits and findings of fewer occurrences.
204. See, e.g., Volpe v. Schlobohm, 614 S.W.2d 615 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981) (rescinding a contract
for mutual mistake); Krezinski v. Hay, 318 N.W.2d 26 (Wis. App. 1982) (same).
205. Victims funds for natural disasters also take this approach of bailout in extreme situations.
2o6. They may also stipulate that a certain dependence or independence exists for judicial
convenience - that is, to avoid litigation costs.
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to. third parties or other externalities.2 °7 The independence approach, after all,
is justified by a presumption of intent to contract in ways consistent with the
background principle of independence. Fairness, furthermore, does not require
a strict independence approach because insured parties do not have uniform
preferences among independence, causation, or effects approaches, as the
analysis above demonstrates. Nor does uniformity have any advantage in itself
or in lowering court costs °8
3. Burdens on the Court System
The independence test changes the occurrence inquiry from a metaphysical
analysis of cause to an empirical investigation of probabilities. But empirical
focus, it can be argued, comes at a severe price: statistical fact-finding may
increase the cost of litigation. Relatedly, critics may argue that statistical
fact-finding places courts at the mercy of experts and, consequently,
compounds litigation inequalities. While these objections do not lack merit,
their force is mitigated by several factors. The first objection is countermanded
by the fact that the necessary data is readily available, precedent generally
limits repetitive litigation by generating principles akin to rules of thumb, and
current theories also rely on experts. The second objection is undermined by
the current reality of insurance litigation, which is already often expert
dependent and involves sophisticated parties.
a. Calculation Costs
Critics may argue that the change from the causation theory to the
independence model will increase the litigation costs already taxing the
economics of insurance 09 by requiring the use of experts, and statistical
207. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178 (1981) (describing the public policy
exception to contract enforcement).
208. It is possible that a move to an independence approach might cause insurers to withdraw
coverage. This development would probably be positive in the sense that it is based on
insurer's ability to manipulate the causation approach to provide them with profits on
insurance that is in fact not economically efficient. Any disadvantages of this development-
presumably based on an important, though probably unrealizable, fear of more liability
because of the change to a new standard-would disappear in the long run and could
probably in the short run be mitigated in contract by aggregate limits, an increasing
phenomenon.
2o9. Owens-Ill., Inc. v. United Ins. Co., 65o A.2d 974, 993 (N.J. 1994) ("One thing is certain:
The present system is inefficient. The largest transaction cost today is money being spent by
insurance companies and industry making claims. [The cost is estimated] at about $500
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analysis. 21' These costs, it could further be argued, might outweigh any gains
in efficiency from the application of a more theoretically appropriate
interpretive rule.
This objection is undermined by the nature of the statistical inquiry, the
court system, and the current mode of insurance litigation. First, the statistical
inquiries in the independence approach rely on data that is already available.
Experts are not needed to produce data, but to analyze it. This type of cost is
one that is different in kind from the cost required in other types of litigation
for the development of empirical studies. To be sure, experts may "battle," but
this cost is a general problem in law, 2 and courts have evolved ways to address
it, such as stipulations by parties, cross-examination, 3 judicial inquiries into
qualifications,1 4 and judicial oversight of the scientific quality of the offered
evidence. 21
Second, and more importantly, precedent on these types of statistical issues
is likely to develop, just as it developed under prior theories.16 In fact, the
emergence of this type of reasoning in proximate causation analysis is one of its
main advantages over the event theory, which requires multiple suits for each
injured party. 7 Similarly for the independence approach, for the first court
that determines whether instances of negligent supervision of an adult who
commits child abuse are independent, there will be costs related to the first
impression status of that question. But the second court that litigates the issue
may be able to rely on the analysis of the first to the extent it is similar. In this
million annually. These are the litigation costs between insured and insurers.") (internal
quotation marks omitted); Harrington & Danzon, supra note 107, at 293 (chronicling
"[h]undreds of millions of dollars" spent on "liability insurance coverage litigation during
the past two decades").
21o. See Yin, supra note 17, at 1258-6o (arguing that reducing duplicative litigation is an
important goal of insurance law).
211. See supra Subsection IV.A.3.
212. Jennifer L. Mnookin, Expert Evidence, Partisanship, and Epistemic Competence, 73 BROOK. L.
REV. 1009, 1009 (20o8) ("The use of expert evidence in court has been criticized for a
remarkably long time.").
213. John Wigmore called cross-examination the "greatest legal engine ever invented for the
discovery of truth." 3 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN
SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1367, at 27 (2d ed. 1923).
214. Mnookin, supra note 212, at 1o16 ("[T]he main vehicle for such regulation as the courts
wished to exercise was qualifications....").
215. See, e.g., Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
216. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 65 (relying on other cases' factual findings regarding
shipments, food poisoning, and other liability-causing events).
217. See Yin, supra note 17, at 1258 (arguing that causation theory allows more joinder).
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way, the issue of occurrences under the independence test will become both a
doctrinal and empirical question as courts address various circumstances over
time. These doctrinal rulings will become akin to rules of thumb on which later
courts can rely. Just as insurance companies rely on the rule of thumb that war
risks are correlated based on the history of insurance practice, so courts may
come to rely on similar propositions tested through numerous court cases. In
fact, the court in Greene, Tweed & Co. relied on precedent in its causation
analysis regarding the factual question of the number of causes in asbestos
products liability.2"8 Such reliance both reduces costs and ensures some
consistency.
This is not to say that the empirical inquiry will fall out of the system: just
as in causation analysis both empirical reasoning- analyzing what is a cause is
a "fact" question 19 -and doctrinal reasoning persisted, so the same should
occur in the independence model. This result is in fact required by the
Supreme Court's acceptance of, yet skeptical attitude toward, offensive
collateral estoppel." ° The Court has noted that it could be used abusively and
thus is not permitted "when the application of offensive estoppel would be
unfair to a defendant.""' Yet, at the same time, courts cannot help but rely on
related factual findings by other courts. Examples of this type of reliance have
even occurred in the criminal context. One court determined that Sudden
Infant Death Syndrome deaths were not necessarily independent."' A later
court relied on this holding. 3 The same reliance has occurred regarding DNA
evidence" 4 and asbestos litigation."'
Finally, this objection regarding cost is undermined by the fact that courts
already use experts to analyze business operations under the causation theory.
Experts, especially on matters of initial impression, as discussed in the
218. Greene, Tweed & Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., No. 03-cv-3637, 2006 WL
1o5o110, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 21, 2006).
219. PROSSER, supra note 113, § 41, at 237 ("Causation is a fact. It is a matter of what has in fact
occurred.").
22o. See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979) (allowing the use of offensive
collateral estoppel).
221. Id. at 331.
222. Wilson v. State, 803 A.2d 1034, 1045 (Md. 2002).
223. Giddens v. State, 812 A.2d 1075, io8o (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2oo2).
224. People v. Soto, 981 P.2d 958, 967 (Cal. 1999); People v. Venegas, 954 P.2d 525, 537 (Cal.
1998); Commonwealth v. Rosier, 685 N.E.2d 739, 744 (Mass. 1997); Commonwealth v.
Blasioli, 713 A.2d 1117, 1124 (Pa. 1998).
225. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Treesdale, Inc., 418 F.3d 330, 337 (3 d Cir. 2005) (relying on other
asbestos cases' number of occurrence determinations).
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preceding paragraph, currently testify as to the decisionmaking that occurs
226within insured organizations. They may testify, for example, as to how
different supervisors were negligent in their supervision, as in Elizabeth N.,
how different doctors committed malpractice independently, as in Helme, or
how different factories produced different parts of defective products, as in
Pincoffs. There is no evidence that changing the topic of expertise will raise
litigation costs more than marginally, especially given the availability of the
data.
b. Dependence on Experts
Relatedly, critics of the independence model may object that it will make
courts reliant on experts - a development that is arguably both bad in itself and
problematic because it will further litigation inequalities. This objection is
countermanded by the current reality of insurance litigation, which is already
expert dependent. Experts testify as to the amount of loss, the type of loss, the
foreseeability of loss, the possibility of loss mitigation, and, under the
causation theory, the cause of loss. 227 Substituting an independence expert for a
causation expert does little to change the tone of insurance litigation.228
Insurance litigation, furthermore, is often between sophisticated parties,
not the insurance company and the average citizen. 9 In large disputes,
primary insurers often battle secondary insurers over issues that affect whether
the secondary insurance is tapped or large companies battle primary insurers
over whether their employees are covered by general insurance policies.2 30 To
be sure, there are disputes between insurance companies and average citizens,
but these occur throughout the law and courts have developed ways to address
226. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 79 (detailing factual findings by courts as to the workings 6f
business).
227. The World Trade Center cases include testimony on all of these points. See, e.g., World
Trade Ctr. Props., L.L.C. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 345 F.3 d 154, 185 (2d Cir. 2003).
228. Some may argue that increased use of experts is a positive development in areas of law that
involve economic efficiency concerns.
229. E.g., Greene, Tweed & Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., Civil Action No. 03-3637,
2006 WL 1050110, at *8 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 21, 2006) (noting that the plaintiff, though the
insured party, was a sophisticated commercial entity). Even when a case names a private
citizen, often an insurer is representing that individual against a different insurer. E.g.,
Mich. Chem. Corp. v. Am. Home Assurance Co., 728 F.2d 374 (6th Cir. 1984) (involving a
reinsurer litigating on the side of insured).
230. E.g., World Trade Cr., 345 F.3d at 159 (discussing how numerous insurers battled each other
on a variety of insurance issues); Mich. Chem. Corp., 728 F.2d at 374 (involving several
insurers battling Michigan Chemical and another insurer).
1530
118:1484 2009
THE LAW OF DESCRIBING ACCIDENTS
any inequalities, including contingent fee arrangements," ' presumptions
against contract drafters,2 32 and case management strategies.2 3  There is no
indication that these methods are less effective in insurance litigation at
reducing the effects of inequality.
V. THE IMPACT OF AN INDEPENDENCE TEST
The previous Part's discussion confirms that the independence proposal is
feasible. This Part will illustrate this point by first working through two case
examples. It will then employ additional examples to demonstrate the impact
of the independence test in changing case outcomes and improving judicial
reasoning and analysis.
A. Examples of Independence Analysis
The cases of Elizabeth N., involving child abuse, and Medical Protective,
involving medical malpractice, provide helpful examples of how an
independence approach would function in practice, including the types of data
required to calculate independence. These examples are particularly instructive
because they involve two very different types of arenas -medicine, which
appears quantifiable as a highly scientific enterprise, and child abuse, which
does not.
In the Elizabeth N. case discussed above, the court considered whether
negligence in the supervision an adult who abused children constituted one or
multiple occurrences. 3 4 To determine whether these events are independent, a
court must first define the loss by progressing through the steps involving
actual and presumed intent outlined in Subsection IV.A.2. Explicit actual intent
is not available, as the policy insured for "all bodily injury and property
damage." 3 ' Actual intent through bargained-for rates is unavailable from the
court's opinion, but may be obtainable. For that metric, the court would
analyze the insurance company's breakdown of homeowner's rates -or market
231. The class action device is also useful.
232. See supra note 57 and accompanying text (discussing contra proferentem).
233. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure give district judges discretion to manage cases with a
heavy hand, if necessary. See FED. R. Crv. P. 16(a) ("In any action, the court may order the
attorneys and any unrepresented parties to appear for one or more pretrial conferences for
such purposes as ... improving the quality of the trial .... ").
234. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Elizabeth N., 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d 327, 327 (Ct. App. 1992).
235. Id. at 329.
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rates for standard homeowner's insurance or daycare insurance -and the rate
paid by the insured in the case to see if it accounted for the risk of child abuse
loss. This investigation is likely to be fruitful because of the sophistication of
insurers with respect to child abuse insurance. Since the rise of child abuse
lawsuits in the 198Os,236 insurers have increasingly charged specifically for child
abuse coverage. One hundred thousand dollars in coverage, for example, costs
approximately $1oo per year."' Thus, investigation of the rate charged to the
insured in this case is likely to yield a conclusion about whether the insured
loss should be defined as an instance of child abuse injury. Unfortunately, the
record in the case fails to indicate such information, although the rate is of
course known by both the insured and the insurer.
Presumed intent is more immediately available. Industry standards, for
example, indicate that a homeowner in the childcare business is starkly
confronted with the risk of child abuse losses. Training programs to prevent
such abuse abound, including programs run by insurance companies
themselves. , 8 While the insured, as a homeowner, did not purchase insurance
solely for the daycare business in this case,239 the industry practice in
home-operated daycare centers strongly indicates that child abuse loss is well
recognized as an atomized unit. The intent of the parties can be presumed from
this industry practice. Common sense confirms this conclusion: it would be
rather striking to focus on the insured instead of the abused individual when
defining a loss in a context in which media focus on the victims of child abuse
and the resources for victims is so strong. 4° In other words, it is reasonable to
presume that, in the context of societal focus on victims of child abuse, the
parties similarly focused on specific abuse losses in their insurance
arrangement. Finally, other areas of the law-notably the victim's rights
movements 4' and the award of restitution in many criminal cases 42- lend
236. Lisa Jones & David Finkelhor, The Decline in Child Sexual Abuse Cases, JUVENILE JUSTICE
BULL. (U.S. Dep't of Justice, Washington, D.C.), Jan. 20o, at i (contrasting a decline in the
199os with the rise in 198os); Tsai, supra note 19o.
237. Tsai, supra note 19o.
238. E.g., Insurance Industry Charitable Foundation, News - Child Abuse Prevention Program
Educational Forum (Apr. 10, 20o8), http://www.iicf.org/news/newsdetails.phpid=gl
(mentioning the Insurance Industry Charitable Foundation's "Child Abuse Prevention
Program").
239. See Elizabeth N., 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 328.
24o. The U.S. government, for example, has compiled a list of resources that demonstrates the
attention given, properly, to victims. E.g., U.S. Department of Justice, Office for Victims of
Crime, http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/ovc (last visited May 4, 2009).
241. E.g., Douglas Evan Beloof, The Third Model of Criminal Process: The Victim Participation
Model, 2 UTAH L. REV. 289 (1999).
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further credence to defining the loss as child abuse. Taken together, these
actual and presumed intent inquiries provide strong evidence that the loss
should be defined as child abuse injury.
Next, the court must inquire as to two probabilities. First, it must
determine the probability of the two instances of child abuse injury, P(A) and
P(B). 43 Since the instances of injury were substantially similar in this case,
only one probability needs to be found. This probability, of course, is the very
one upon which the insurer based the premium and the insured determined
whether the premium was appropriately priced. 44 While the insurer probably
has more accurate data that is discernable through discovery 5 or is perhaps
semi-public, 46 well-grounded calculations can be made based on widely
available data. Federal government surveys indicate that the rate of child abuse
injuries in 1999, about five years from the date of this case, was approximately
11.8 of looo children, or 1.18%. 
47
The court must also find the probability that multiple instances of child
abuse injury will occur for a particular party. 4 Here, the court should look to
data on repeat violations. Insurers will have such data pursuant to their
estimations of overall liability per insured entity. Government organizations,
particularly crime agencies, policymakers, and scholars will likely also have
such data as a part of their operations. 49 The same federal government survey
242. 18 U.S.C. § 2259 (2000).
243. The reference class would change if the insurer adjusted the premium because of the daycare
aspect of the insured.
244. As discussed above, in the child abuse context the rate is likely to be distinguishable in the
premium.
245. Rose French, Report: Protestant Church Insurers Handle 26o Sex Abuse Cases a Year, INS. J.,
June 18, 2007, http://www.insurancejoumal.com/news/national/2oo7/ o6/18/8o877.htm
(discussing the information insurers have on child abuse lawsuits and payouts).
246. See supra Part IV (discussing insurer trade associations' aggregation of data).
247. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CHILD MALTREATMENT REPORT 1999 § 2.1 (1999),
available at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cb/pubs/cm99/cpt2.htm. Other similar
surveys put forth similar figures. NAT'L COMMITTEE FOR PREVENTION OF CHILD ABUSE,
CHILD ABUSE FACTS & STATISTICS (1998), available at
http://www.dayofthechild.org/dc98/Library/pdf/9912o4.pdf (listing a 1.5% rate). It is
important to note that disputes over statistics are acceptable, just as any other dispute
among experts is a part of contested litigation. The more important point is that such
statistics exist.
248. This probability is necessary to determine the intersection of the losses.
249. The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, for example, collects resources, data,
and information. See generally Child Welfare Information Gateway,
http://www.childwelfare.gov (last visited May 4, 2009) (collecting "[r]esources about child
maltreatment, including definitions, signs and symptoms, statistics and prevalence, types of
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indicates that 7.5% of victims suffer one or more subsequent incidents. s5 Thus,
o.o885% of children are victims of multiple abuses. This number differs from
the square of the general child abuse rate of 1.18%, which is 0.0139%. Thus, the
likelihood that a particular homeowner will experience multiple child abuse
losses to the same child is highly dependent. 21 Expert opinion confirms this
conclusion. Abused children, for example, are 96% more likely to experience
abuse, recurring abuse in their case, than nonabused children.5 2 Based on this
calculation, therefore, the court likely reached the right result that multiple
instances of child abuse constituted one occurrence.5 3
In Medical Protectives 4 the court considered whether a medical malpractice
episode in which a patient suffered blindness after a pattern of treatment,
including numerous visits, examinations, prescriptions, and other decisions by
one physician constituted one or multiple occurrences. The court must first
define the loss by progressing through the steps involving actual or presumed
intent. In this case, actual intent as derived from explicit statement is
unavailable from the court record, although the insurance contract of course
exists. Actual intent as derived from bargained-for rates, however, is likely to
be instructive. In fact, the rates likely need not be closely examined due to the
nature of the contract. In this case, Medical Protective insured a pediatrician.
Even if the policy was not explicitly a contract for medical malpractice
insurance, the attention to medical malpractice makes it implausible for the
rates of an insurance company insuring a doctor not to include a medical
malpractice factor. Industry standards confirm this point: doctors are acutely
aware of medical malpractice costs, as the current medical malpractice crisis
reinforces."' Appeal to common sense reasoning and other areas of law is
unnecessary. Rather, the intent evident in the nature of the contract shows that
the loss should be defined as medical malpractice injury.
child abuse and neglect, risk and protective factors, the impact on individuals and society,
and child fatalities"). Recidivism rates may also be useful in this inquiry regarding multiple
children.
250. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HuMAN SERVS., supra note 247, § 2.1.
251. If the square of the probability of one child abuse injury differs from the probability of
multiple child abuse injuries, then the injuries are dependent.
252. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CHILD MALTREATMENT REPORT 2006 ch. 3 (20o6),
available at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cb/pubs/cmo6/cmo6.pdf.
253. As indicated in the discussion of incentives, this finding is neither pro-victim, pro-insured,
or pro-insurer because of the diversity of interactions among the amounts of losses,
deductibles, and limits.
254. 575 F. Supp. 9Ol (N.D. Ill. 1983).
255. Michelle M. Mello, David M. Studert & Troyen A. Brennan, The New Medical Malpractice
Crisis, 348 NEw ENG. J. MED. 2281 (2003).
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Next in the independence approach, the court must inquire as to several
probabilities for correlation analysis. First, it must determine the probability of
medical malpractice loss in the individual treatments, such as a prescription or
an examination. Medical practitioners and insurers use this type of data when
deciding whether to buy and sell insurance at a certain price.2s6 Numerous
studies conclude that medical malpractice occurs at approximately a rate of 1%
of all patients." 7 Second, the court must determine the probability of multiple
medical malpractice losses for one individual in order to compare the
intersection of the losses2s 8 to the square of the probability of one malpractice
loss. The federal government reports that 11,769 malpractice reports are made
annually regarding medical practitioners. 9 Assuming that the rate of multiple
reports per practitioner and the percentages of practitioners who are physicians
have been consistent over time, there would have to be approximately 45,000
doctors in the United States for malpractice injuries to be independent, 60 an
256. John O'Brien, SC Won't Hear Hospital's Appeal in Self-Insured Doctor's Case,
LEGALNEWSLINE.COM, Mar. 1, 2007, http://www.legalnewsline.com/news/1912o3-sc-wont-
hear-hospitals-appeal-in-self-insured-doctors-case (chronicling practitioner's decision to
self-insure); Doctor's Medical Malpractice Insurance Plan,
http://www.insuranceclaimsconsult.com/medical-maLpracticeinsurance.htm (last visited
May 4, 2009) (instructing doctors how to decide whether to self-insure).
257: Medical malpractice rates are oft-studied. Studies in the 1970s, 198os, and 199os confirm an
approximately one in one hundred rate. See TOM BAKER, THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE MYTH
24-36 (2005) (summarizing landmark studies at Harvard and other leading institutions).
For this inquiry, this general rate is sufficiently specific because the loss is medical
malpractice injury generally.
258. If statistics are not available, a court may rely on testimony from hospitals that employ
doctors, medical review boards that evaluate doctors and hospitals, insurance companies
that insure doctors, and policymakers who design malpractice systems.
259. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., NATIONAL PRACTITIONER DATA BANK 2006
ANNUAL REPORT 72 (2006).
26o. Id. at 41, 72. If medical malpractice injuries are independent in 20o6, then:
P(malpractice injury for a physician in 2006)2= P(two malpractice injuries for a physician in
2006).
Treating the left side of the equation first:
P(malpractice injury for a physician in 20o6)2 = (number of malpractice injuries fromn
physicians in 20o6/number of physicians in 2006)2 = ((number of malpractice injuries from
practitioners in 20o6 * percentage of malpractice injuries generally from
physicians)/number of physicians in 20o6)2 = ((number of malpractice injuries from
practitioners in 20o6) * (number of malpractice injuries from physicians 199o-
2006/number of malpractice injuries from practitioners 1990-2o6))/number of physicians
in2006) 2 = ((11,769 * (164,877/237,835 ))/X)
2 = (8151.82/X)
2 =
Treating the right side of the equation now:
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
order of magnitude lower than the approximate number of physicians
practicing in the United States.261 In other words, the court likely decided the
number of occurrences correctly because malpractice incidents for individual
physicians are dependent. Expert opinion that a few doctors account for a




B. Differences in Case Outcomes Under the Independence Test
Contrary to any suggestion from the preceding analysis, not all cases come
out the same way under an independence approach and a causation approach, a
welcome deviation given the coincidence that courts in both the cases in the
previous Subsection ruled for the insured with questionable reasoning.263 Of
couse, even if the results are the same, the independence approach has several
advantages, as described in Section IV.B. But, as a general matter, the results
differ when compared to an independence approach: the liability event theory
at times yields too many causes and thus too many occurrences because it
arbitrarily focuses on liability triggers, and liabilities are often dependent, while
the proximate cause theory at times yields too few causes and thus too few
occurrences because it arbitrarily focuses on one of the causes and numerous
independent causes may be present.
6 4
P(two malpractice injuries for a physician in 2006) = number of two malpractice injuries for
physicians / number of physicians = (rate of multiple malpractice injuries for physicians *
number of malpractice injuries for practitioners * percentage of malpractice injuries
generally from physicians) / X = (((number of malpractice injuries for physicians in 199o-
2006 - number of malpractice injuries for physicians with only one injury in 1990-2o6)/
number of malpractice injuries for physicians in 2006) * number of malpractice injuries for
practitioners * (number of malpractice injuries from physicians 1990-2o6/number of
malpractice injuries from practitioners 1990-2o6))/X = (((164,877-134,663)/164,877) *
11,759 * (164,877/ 237,8 3 5))/X = 1493.84/X.
Thus, the two sides of the equations are the same only if (8151.82/X)
2 
= 14 93.84/X, or ifX =
8151.822/1493.84 = 44,484.13 physicians.
261. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, PHYSICIAN WORKFORCE: PHYSICIAN SUPPLY INCREASED
IN METROPOLITAN AND NONMETROPOLITAN AREAS BUT GEOGRAPHIC DIFFERENCES
PERSISITED 7 (20O3) (reporting 681,ooo physicians in 2001); U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY
OFFICE, PRIMARY CARE PROFESSIONALS: RECENT SUPPLY TRENDS, PROJECTIONS, AND
VALUATION OF SERVICES 8 (2008) (reporting approximately 8oo,ooo physicians in 2005).
262. E.g., FRANKA. SLOAN & LINDSEY M. CHEPKE, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 191 (20o8) (noting that
a few physicians account for much of the malpractice payments).
263. See Section III.A (criticizing courts for outcome-based judging).
264. Outcome-based judging, as suggested above, may also play a role.
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Taking the liability event view first, cases that find multiple occurrences
when there are multiple injured parties are often inconsistent with an
independence approach. In Koikos, for example, the court found that multiple
gunshots constituted multiple instances of negligent failure to provide
adequate security and, thus, multiple occurrences.26s Under an independence
approach, the first inquiry for the court is the definition of the loss. Here, as in
the medical malpractice case discussed above, Medical Protective, the loss
definition is straightforward. The policy covers "bodily injury' ,26 6 and two such
injuries occurred for two different victims. The loss, therefore, is the injury
taking place on the property. Resort to actual intent as derived from bargained-
for rates or analysis of presumed intent through industry practice and other
considerations are unnecessary. At this stage, it should be noted that the
analysis parallels the Koikos courts' reasoning. But the court's method then
diverged because of its use of the causation approach. The independence test,
on the other hand, proceeds a step in a different direction to analyze statistical
independence. It is this stage that changes the ultimate result.
At this stage, the court must determine whether the losses are independent.
While the insurer probably has more accurate data that is discernable or
discoverable, publicly available information provides strong evidence for
dependence, even without statistical analysis. Studies repeatedly demonstrate
that criminal activity is not spread evenly through property areas but is rather
concentrated in certain areas. 6 7 Entire police strategies are based on such
understandings. 68 In fact, an entire branch of sociology has tasked itself with
265. Koikos v. Travelers Ins. Co., 849 So. 2d 263, 264 (Fla. 2003).
266. Id. at 271.
267. Scott Freeman, Jeremy Grogger & Jon Sonstelie, The Spatial Concentration of Crime, 40 J.
URBAN ECON. 216, 216 (1996) ("Every American city has unsafe neighborhoods where the
chances of being robbed are dramatically higher than in the rest of the city. While this
spatial concentration of crime is a fact of life, it seems at odds with common notions of
resource allocation."); Jack L. Nasar & Bonnie Fisher, 'Hot Spots' of Fear and Crime: A
Multi-Method Investigation, 13 J. ENVTL. PSYCH. 187, 187 (1993) ("Crime and fear tend to
concentrate in certain areas and situations ... called 'hot spots."'); JOHN E. ECK, ET AL.,
MAPPING CRIME: UNDERSTANDING HOT SPOTS 1 (2005), available at
http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/2o9393.pdf ("Crime is not spread evenly across maps. It
clumps in some areas and is absent in others. People use this knowledge in their daily
activities.").
268. JOHN E. ECK, DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ASSESSING RESPONSES TO PROBLEMS: AN INTRODUCTORY
GUIDE FOR POLICE PROBLEM-SOLVERS 34-37 (2004) (discussing the importance of statistics in
studying displacement of crime to other areas); ECK ET AL., supra note 267, at iii ("Much of
crime mapping is devoted to detecting high-crime-density areas known as hot spots. Hot
spot analysis helps police identify high-crime areas, types of crime being committed, and the
best way to respond.").
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
explaining this phenomenon.26 9 The evidence, therefore, suggests that criminal
injuries on a property are dependent. The liability event theory, as a result,
contravenes the independence assumption of insurance by finding two causes
and thus two occurrences.27 °
Similarly, cases decided under the proximate cause view conflict with an
independence approach, particularly when there are numerous incidents
attributed to the insured. For example, in Greene, Tweed & Co. discussed above,
the court found that the dissemination of 105 different asbestos products to
over 6o,ooo injured claimants constituted one occurrence.2 7' This ruling limits
the coverage of the insurers to the single occurrence limit. Under an
independence approach, the result would likely differ. According to that
framework, the court first defines the loss. Here, for the same reason as in the
medical malpractice case above - insurance is purchased for products liability -
the loss is products-related injury.2 72 The next step in the independence
approach is to test the independence of such losses. Without turning this Note
into an investigation of asbestos injury statistics, a few remarks can be made
that point toward a different result than that reached by the court. First of all,
losses from products are likely more correlated when arising from the same
product than from different products. The correlation among losses for a
particular product is likely high: knowledge that use of Product A creates a
product liability loss is indicative of a higher probability of another loss
regarding Product A. After all, products liability injury turns on product
defects likely to be shared by products of the same model. This correlation, of
course, is why products liability law revolves around class actions. But, the
correlation for losses among a loss from Product A and a loss from Product B is
less clear. Many product manufacturers make more than one product, but not
all such manufacturers experience products-related injury on more than one
product. This analysis indicates, at the very least, that there is a difference in
269. Anthony E. Bottoms & Paul Wiles, Environmental Criminology, in 2 CRIME: CRITICAL
CONCEPTS IN SOCIOLOGY 326, 327 (Philip Bean ed., 2003) ("Traditionally, the two central
concerns of environmental criminology have been explaining the spatial distribution of offences
and explaining the spatial distribution of offenders.").
270. It is important to note the advantage this reasoning has over the dissent's hypothetical
regarding the machine gun criminal discussed above. See supra Part III. While there is no
principled way to decide whether the majority or the dissent rightly assessed the number of
causes in that case, the empirical reasoning of the independence approach provides an
objective method of analysis and, epistemological problems aside, a correct answer.
271. Greene, Tweed & Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co." No. 03-cv-3637, 2006 WL
105011o, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 21, 20o6).
2a. See supra Section V.A.
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correlation between the various losses of the 6o,ooo injured parties in this case
and that at least some of the losses from the 1O5 products may be independent.
There is another more fundamental reason why the independence approach
likely changes the result in this case, one related to the concept of legal
independence and the expectations of the parties. Legal independence allows
parties to adapt a standard other than perfect independence. It is based on the
recognition that the intent of the parties is the touchstone of insurance contract
interpretation. Here, the evidence indicates that the parties contracted as if the
losses were independent. In this case, a one occurrence finding leaves Greene,
Tweed & Co. with total insurance of $1 million for products liability for each of
nine of thirteen years in dispute in the litigation. The company, however,
manufactured over io5 products used in 33 states and 15 foreign countries. If all
of those products were treated as one for products liability purposes, as the
courts' ruling implied, Greene, Tweed & Co. would be severely underinsured,
only insuring for at most ten thousand dollars for each product.
The insurance contract itself confirms the oddity of this result. In products
liability, it is industry practice to, at times, rely on a "batch clause" to roll
separate personal injury claims into a single occurrence. 73 Such clauses provide
that "with respect to products liability, all damages arising out of one lot of
goods or products prepared or acquired by the named insured should be
considered as arising out of one occurrence or accident."274 The purpose of
such clauses is to "reduce the number of occurrences whenever the same
product ... causes multiple bodily injuries or property damage. 2 75 The
contract in this case, however, did not include such clauses. The omission of
language to roll injuries from the same product together is suggestive of the
parties' intent to take the more extreme step of rolling injuries from separate
products to together. Thus, at the very least, the evidence of intent suggests
that the parties contracted for a policy that treats products liability of separate
products as separate occurrences. In other words, both statistical reasoning,
even if without actual statistics, and intent-based reasoning under the legal
independence framework indicate that some of the losses in this case were -in
fact or in the parties' view -independent. The one occurrence finding of the
court, then, is likely incorrect under an independence approach.
273. OSTRAGER & NEWMAN, supra note 20, § 9.02[C], at 47.
274- Id.
275. Id. (internal citation omitted).
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C. A Better justification for Some Case Outcomes
The independence approach also explains why the cases described above
involving World Trade Center terrorism, discrimination, and products liability
that stretch causation beyond its normal concept may in fact be correctly
decided. Judges in these cases may be making plausible judgments as to
statistical correlation. Their error, then, would be in omitting their actual
reasoning, not their resolution of the case. This congruence is most likely to
occur when the causation and independence approaches overlap, that is, when
empirical reality conforms to intuitive causation metaphysics. Unfortunately,
this mode of analysis leads to unfavorable results as well. As Part III
demonstrated, the causation approach leads to inconsistent rulings and,
potentially, outcome-based judging.
Most notably, the WTC case appears correctly decided on an independence
view, but not for the reasons the causation theory proposes.276 Instead of
asking whether the attack on the Twin Towers constituted one cause or two,
the court should have inquired as to the statistical probabilities involving losses
of buildings. Under an independence approach, courts first define the loss.
Here, each building was insured, so the loss is the destruction of each building.
The next question for investigation should have been whether the first insured
event, the loss of the first building, was independent of the second building
loss. Historical evidence regarding large-scale building losses, and not analysis
of the particular plans of a terrorist group, is most relevant. 77 All the available
evidence-direct historical and indirect industry-based- confirms the
dependence of the events: Historically, it is clear that large-scale losses of
buildings are not independent. War and natural disasters do not target
selectively. For example, Hurricane Katrina destroyed entire neighborhoods
with flooding damage.27 World War II's fire bombing of Dresden, similarly,
devastated large portions of the city. Earthquakes are also particularly broad in
their damage. The famous 1994 Northridge earthquake in Los Angeles caused
276. The discussion here refers to the issue of the number of occurrences in each type of contract,
not the type of contract applicable to each insurer.
277. Some commentators believe that terrorism is uninsurable because of the lack of historical
evidence. See Boardman, supra note 151, at 815 (arguing that the historical evidence
regarding terrorism is too limited for analysis). This reasoning, however, overemphasizes
the experience of the United States: terrorism has been occurring throughout world history,
particularly during the twentieth century, in Western Europe, Eastern Europe, Latin
America, Southeast Asia, Africa, and the Middle East.
278. For an interactive map of the flooding from Hurricane Katrina, see Times-Picayune, Flash
Flood, http://www.nola.con-/katrina/graphics/flashflood.swf (last visited May 4, 2009).
1540
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both the Northridge Mountain apartment complex and the nearby Northridge
Fashion Center to collapse. Twenty billion dollars in damages, fifty-seven
deaths, and nine thousand injuries resulted.279 As the U.S. government reports,
1,6oo buildings were "red-tagged" as too damaged to enter and 7,300 were
restricted to limited entry as "yellow-tagged.2 8°
The insurance industry's practice also provides indirect evidence of this
dependency. The traditional exclusions for war and natural disaster 8, imply
that destruction of entire buildings is highly correlated. At the very least, it
indicates belief that such losses are correlated, a relevant consideration for legal
independence analysis. Overall, the independence approach asks better
questions -historical, statistical, and intent-based- than the courts' analysis
regarding terrorist plans. 8
Other areas of law are similarly susceptible to better justification under
independence analysis. In discrimination cases," 83 for example, the causation
approach classifies the losses as stemming from one cause, and thus
constituting one occurrence, in strained fashion, as Section III.B indicates. The
independence approach confirms this result, but without straining the concept
of proximate causation. Under the independence approach, courts first define
the loss: here, injuries from discrimination. The next step is to analyze the
dependence of such losses. The evidence suggests that the individual acts of
discrimination, for which one is insured, are dependent: knowing that one loss
occurred hints at whether another occurred. The evidence for this claim, even
without statistics, is twofold. Psychological and sociological research suggests
that racism is embedded in and fostered by cultures. 84 Social psychology
studies demonstrate that groups and culture are sources of norms, reinforce
those norms, and encourage actions on those norms. For example, in the classic
279. U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY FOR THE FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, USGS RESPONSE TO
AN URBAN EARTHQUAKE - NORTHRIDGE '94 (1996), available at
http://pubs.usgs.gov/of/1996/ofr-96-o263/introduc.htm#impacts.
280. Id.
281. See Boardman, supra note 151, at 821 ("War is perhaps the ultimate correlated clash event.");
see also Diamond Shamrock Chems. Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 6o9 A.2d 44o, 472 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1992) ("It is difficult to devise an actuarial guide for properly
determining the amount of [war] premiums.").
282. This example highlights the tension between an intent-based approach and an ex post
independence approach, as before September 11, policies were less likely to encompass loss
based on terrorism of the scale of the WTC attacks, as opposed to similar losses from
natural disasters.
283. See sources cited supra note lo.
284. For a discussion of a prominent example, see Eugene McLaughlin & Karim Murji, After the
Stephen Lawrence Report, 19 CRITICAL SOC. POL'Y 371 (1999).
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study of Bennington College's influence on political beliefs, Theodore
Newcomb found that students moved further from their parents' attitudes and
closer to the attitudes of the college community over time: 66% of parents
favored the Republican presidential candidate, while 62% of freshmen, 43% of
sophomores, and only is% of juniors and seniors favored the Republican.
8 ,
There are also significant momentum effects to group behavior: groups that
lean toward a certain perspective are more likely to become extreme in that
perspective through interaction with each other.28 6 This research indicates that
it is highly likely that cultures of racism are at play in many discrimination
cases and that, consequently, discrimination losses are likely to be correlated.
More abstractly, American experience with the civil rights movement and
antidiscrimination efforts in the states and localities demonstrates the role of
repeat players. The structural injunction as a novel type of remedy arose for
this very reason in the desegregation context. The certification of numerous
class actions confirms the similarity, and thus dependence, among cases. With
this evidence, it is hard to contest the conclusion that one incident of
discrimination intimates another: losses are dependent. It makes sense,
therefore, to treat all of them as one occurrence despite the presence of
contributing causes in each individual case of discrimination. Thus, while these
decisions strain the concept of proximate cause by undermining its traditional
connection to responsibility, they comport with an independence approach -
even that done without the necessary statistical analysis.
This subsection has not conclusively proved the appropriateness of certain
outcomes under the independence approach. Rather, it has demonstrated by
example the superiority of an independence approach in offering rationales for
case outcomes. The proximate cause approach strains the proximate cause
concept, undermining the coherence of the decisions under it, as discussed
above. The independence approach, however, avoids this problem while
validating some of the judges' intuitive conclusions. This feature is valuable as
long as common sense is accorded some deference as a metric for evaluating
theories.
285. THEODORE M. NEWCOMB, PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL CHANGE (1943).
286. SOLOMON E. ASCH, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY (1952); Solomon E. Asch, Effects of Group Pressure
Upon Modification and Distortion of Judgments, in READINGS IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY (E.E.
Macoby et al., 3d ed. 1958); Solomon E. Asch, Opinions and Social Pressures, 193 Sci. AM. 31
(1955).
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CONCLUSION
This Note made several arguments regarding the problem of determining
the number of occurrences. First, it acknowledged that the number of
occurrences issue does not lend itself to easy pro-insured or pro-insurer
solutions. Second, it argued that courts apply multiple theories and that these
theories are applied inconsistently, are often internally inconsistent, and strain
the traditional concept of causation on which they claim to rest. Third, it
argued that the dominant theory-a causation approach -conflicts with a
crucial assumption of insurance, that the insurable events are statistically
independent. Finally, it proposed a new approach based on the concept of
independence as more theoretically satisfying and consistent.
Because the independence proposal is novel and the causation approach is
entrenched, numerous questions remain worthy of investigation before an
industry conservative by nature will embrace an interpretive change. For
example, under an independence scheme, would parties specify certain unique
levels of contractual independence or would they seek a uniform rule? Would
additional data compilers emerge as sources? Would a shift to the
independence approach increase or decrease the coverage offered by insurers?
These questions and others deserve further investigation and perhaps empirical
study.
This Note's argument for replacing causation approaches with an
independence approach presumes a certain view of the insurance system and
the courts. It presumes that courts should enforce the bargain the parties strike
and that the parties strike an economic bargain based on economic reasoning.
These are not uncontested presumptions. Some commentators appear to
believe that the parties do not reason economically or that courts should use
insurance adjudication to further societal goals, such as risk spreading or
distributional justice.28 7 These are worthy goals, although their furtherance
through the insurance system may be less attractive. It is not this Note's goal,
however, to resolve the purpose of the insurance system and its adjudication in
the courts. Rather, this Note tries to point out that an economic view of
insurance and its adjudication requires a more quantitative, and less subjective,
approach to solving the legal problems that arise in insurance disputes. It
makes more sense to analyze statistics than to do metaphysics to define
occurrence when courts are trying to play an economic, as opposed to a social,
role. Instead of trying to ascertain philosophically whether the tragedy of
287. See, e.g., BAKER, supra note 20, at 4-19.
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September 11 arose from one cause or multiple causes, for example, courts
should ask whether the losses arose from statistically correlated acts.
